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ABSTRACT 
 While prior research documents that analyst sometimes herd their forecasts, very few 
studies investigate how investors’ judgments are influenced by their perceptions about the 
likelihood of analyst herding. In this dissertation, I conduct two experimental studies to 
investigate conditions under which investors’ assessments of uncertainty about future earnings 
are influenced by their perceptions about the likelihood of analyst herding. My first study 
extends research on the determinants of forecasters’ uncertainty judgments by examining the 
joint influence of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility on investors’ uncertainty 
judgments, to provide insights into whether investors consider the likelihood of analyst herding 
in a situation that allows for, but does not prompt investors to think of, herding. Results suggest 
that investors do not consider the likelihood of analyst herding based on the relation between 
analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility. My second study provides a potential 
explanation for the mixed findings documented in prior research about investors’ reactions to the 
likelihood of analyst herding by examining the joint influence of the temporal order and 
preference-consistency of analyst forecasts on investors’ uncertainty judgments. Results suggest 
that investors consider the likelihood of analyst herding, and perceptions about herding influence 
investors’ uncertainty judgments, when analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent, but not 
when analyst forecasts are preference-consistent. In addition, my second study extends research 
on investors’ credulity by suggesting that motivated reasoning and skepticism can be an 
additional mechanism that contributes to that credulity. Further, the findings of my two studies 
provide implications and opportunities for future research on investors’ reactions to the 
characteristics of analyst forecasts, investors’ reactions to the likelihood of analyst herding, and 
the determinants of investors’ uncertainty judgments.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
My dissertation investigates the circumstances under which investors react as if analysts 
are herding. Specifically, I conduct two experimental studies to investigate conditions under 
which investors’ judgments of uncertainty about future earnings are influenced by their 
perceptions about the likelihood of analyst herding. Analyst herding refers to an analyst 
underweighting his/her private information and overweighting the information obtained by 
observing other analysts’ forecasts when making his/her own forecast (Trueman, 1994). Herding 
artificially decreases forecast dispersion even though uncertainty about future earnings does not 
change.   
A large literature in accounting, economics and finance suggests that financial analysts 
sometimes herd their earnings forecasts (e.g., Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001; Clarke and 
Subramanian, 2006; Clement and Tse, 2005; and Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000). Prior 
research also documents that investors react to analyst forecast dispersion as a measure of 
uncertainty about future earnings (Barron and Steurke, 1998; and Lerman, 2010). Because 
investors’ uncertainty judgments influence their assessments of a stock’s riskiness, estimates of 
cost of capital, and investment decisions (Erickson, Wang, and Zhang, 2011; and Imhoff and 
Lobo, 1992), it is important to understand when and why investors’ uncertainty judgments are 
influenced by their perceptions about the likelihood of analyst herding.   
However, prior research provides mixed findings related to investors’ reactions to the 
likelihood of analyst herding. Several authors have warned that investors do not typically 
recognize analyst herding (e.g., Cote and Goodstein, 1999; and Glassman, 2001), which suggests 
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that herding is likely to lead to undesirable investment consequences such as making suboptimal 
allocation of capital, increasing noise in stock prices, exacerbating the volatility of stock returns, 
and destabilizing capital markets (e.g., Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001; DeLong, et al., 1990; 
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1992; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010; and Morris and Shin, 1999). In 
addition, Olsen (1996) presents archival evidence suggesting that the market fails to react to 
herding in analyst forecasts.  Research on investors’ credulity also suggests that investors’ 
overconfidence and limited attention prevent them from identifying the incentives of more-
informed market participants such as managers and analysts (Daniel, Hershleifer, and Teoh, 
2002), along with a number of experimental studies documenting that forecast users (e.g., 
investors) tend to overestimate the informativeness of expert (e.g., analyst) forecasts as the 
redundancy in these forecasts increases (Maines, 1990; 1996; and Soll, 1999). 
In contrast, several more recent studies suggest that investors are likely to react to the 
likelihood of herding in analyst forecasts and recommendations which, as Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2010) explain, suggests that the undesirable investment consequences associated with analyst 
herding may not occur. Specifically, an experimental study by Bloomfield and Hales (2009) 
suggests that investors expect analysts to be influenced by the outstanding consensus forecast 
when analysts can observe the consensus.  Recent archival evidence also suggests that the market 
identifies and accounts for herding in analyst recommendations (Jegadeesh and Kim 2010) and 
forecasts (Kim and Pantzalis 2003). In addition, Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) and Shroff, 
Venkataraman, and Xin (2005) find that the market reacts more strongly to forecasts issued by 
leader analysts compared to subsequent confirming forecasts issued by follower analysts.   
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Chapter 2 presents my first study, in which I investigate whether investors react as if they 
consider the likelihood of analyst herding when estimating uncertainty about future earnings 
based on analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility. Prior research shows that in addition 
to analyst forecast dispersion, earnings volatility is another measure used by investors to estimate 
uncertainty about future earnings (Blume and Friend, 1978; and Frankel and Litov, 2009). As 
analyst herding reduces forecast dispersion without affecting earnings volatility, Olsen (1996) 
argues that analyst herding is likely in situations characterized by low forecast dispersion and 
high earnings volatility. Therefore, manipulating analyst forecast dispersion and earnings 
volatility creates a situation that allows for, but does not prompt investors to think of, analyst 
herding.  
If investors react as if they consider the likelihood of herding, their uncertainty judgments 
are expected to be strongly influenced by the level of earnings volatility when forecast dispersion 
is low. However, based on prior research on investors’ information preferences and reactions to 
expert forecast dispersion, I predict that investors’ uncertainty judgments, and willingness to 
invest in a firm, will be more strongly influenced by earnings volatility when analyst forecast 
dispersion is high rather than low. This prediction implies that investors are expected to react as 
if they do not consider the likelihood of herding. In addition, I predict that when analyst forecast 
dispersion is high, investors’ uncertainty judgments will mediate the influence of earnings 
volatility on investors’ willingness to invest. Results of my first study confirm these predictions.  
 Of particular importance is the finding that when analyst forecast dispersion is low, 
investors estimate low uncertainty and high willingness to invest, regardless of the level of 
earnings volatility. This finding suggests that investors do not consider the likelihood of herding 
when estimating uncertainty based on forecast dispersion and earnings volatility. However, one 
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limitation of my first study is that variations in the manipulated variables do not necessarily have 
to influence investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding. For example, investors may 
conclude that analysts possess common information that leads them to make similar forecasts, 
which results in low analyst forecast dispersion regardless of high earnings volatility. Another 
limitation of my first study is that I do not measure investors’ estimates of the likelihood of 
analyst herding explicitly. 
 Chapter 3 presents my second study, which is designed to mitigate these limitations from 
the first study. Based on prior research that documents mixed findings about investors’ reactions 
to the likelihood of analyst herding (e.g., Bloomfield and Hales, 2009; Cooper, Day, and Lewis, 
2001; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010; and Olsen, 1996), I examine factors that are expected to help 
reconcile these mixed findings. Specifically, I manipulate the temporal order of analyst forecasts 
(defined as whether analysts issue their forecasts at different times or the same time) and the 
preference-consistency of analyst forecasts (defined as whether analyst forecasts are inconsistent 
or consistent with investors’ directional preferences).  
Based on research on motivated reasoning and skepticism and research on causal 
inferences, I predict and show that the preference consistency of analyst forecasts moderates the 
influence of temporal order on investors’ uncertainty judgments. Specifically, the influence of 
temporal order (i.e., the increase in investors’ uncertainty when analysts issue their forecasts 
successively rather than concurrently) is greater when analyst forecasts are preference-
inconsistent rather than preference-consistent. In addition, when analyst forecasts are preference-
inconsistent, investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding mediate the influence of 
temporal order on investors’ uncertainty judgments.  
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Taken together, my two studies make a number of important contributions to the 
literature. The first study extends research on the determinants of forecasters’ uncertainty 
judgments by examining the joint influence of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility 
on investors’ uncertainty judgments. Results show that analyst forecast dispersion moderates the 
influence of earnings volatility on investors’ uncertainty judgments. My second study helps 
reconcile conflicting research findings related to investors’ reactions to the likelihood of analyst 
herding by illustrating that the preference-consistency of analyst forecasts moderates these 
reactions. Moreover, my second study contributes to research on investors’ credulity which 
suggests that two mechanisms, limited attention and overconfidence, prevent investors from 
detecting the incentives of more-informed market participants (Daniel et al., 2002). My study 
suggests that motivated reasoning and skepticism can be an additional mechanism that 
contributes to investors’ credulity.   
Chapter 4 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the findings of my two studies and 
discussing the broader implications of these findings for research on investors’ reactions to the 
characteristics of analyst forecasts and research on the determinants of investors’ uncertainty 
judgments. The chapter also suggests opportunities for future research. Future studies can 
examine other potential determinants of investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding, 
such as investors’ sophistication and analyst reputation. Further, studies can examine additional 
situations in which investors’ reactions to analyst forecast dispersion are influenced by investors’ 
perceptions about analysts, their characteristics and motivations, and the firms they follow. 
Studies can also examine the influence of temporal order on investors’ reactions to analyst 
forecast boldness as well as additional effects of the preference-consistency of analyst forecasts 
on investors’ reactions to information obtained from analysts.   
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CHAPTER 2 
STUDY 1: THE JOINT INFLUENCE OF ANALYST FORECAST DISPERSION AND 
EARNINGS VOLATILITY ON INVESTORS’ UNCERTAINTY JUDGMENTS AND 
WILLINGNESS TO INVEST 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present my first study that examines whether investors react as if they 
consider the likelihood of analyst herding when estimating uncertainty about future earnings 
based on analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility. Specifically, I examine how analyst 
forecast dispersion and earnings volatility jointly influence investors’ uncertainty judgments and 
willingness to invest in a firm. As discussed in Chapter 1, prior research shows that investors 
react to analyst forecast dispersion (Barron and Steurke, 1998; and Lerman, 2010) and earnings 
volatility (Blume and Friend, 1978; and Frankel and Litov, 2009) as measures of uncertainty 
about future earnings. As analyst herding reduces forecast dispersion without affecting earnings 
volatility, Olsen (1996) suggests that herding is likely in situations characterized by low forecast 
dispersion and high earnings volatility. I argue that if investors consider the likelihood of analyst 
herding, their judgments will be strongly influenced by earnings volatility when forecast 
dispersion is low.  
Prior studies in psychology and accounting show that forecasters’ (e.g., investors’) 
uncertainty judgments are positively influenced by the volatility of the forecasted variable (e.g., 
future earnings) (Du and Budescu, 2007; and Eggleton, 1982) and expert (e.g., analyst) forecast 
dispersion (Budescu and Rantilla, 2000; Budescu et al., 2003). My study extends that research by 
examining the joint influence of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility on investors’ 
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uncertainty judgments, to provide insights into whether investors naturally consider analyst 
herding in a situation that allows for, but does not prompt an investor to think of, analyst herding.     
I predict that analyst forecast dispersion will moderate the influence of earnings volatility 
on investors’ uncertainty judgments. Prior research shows that when investors have access to 
information from multiple sources, they prefer to rely on summary information obtained from 
experts, such as forecasts and recommendations, to make investment judgments and decisions 
(e.g., Hodge and Pronk, 2006; and Önkal et al., 2009). In this instance, when investors have 
access to both analyst forecasts and historical earnings information, they will be inclined to 
estimate uncertainty about future earnings based on analyst forecast dispersion rather than 
earnings volatility. However, previous studies show that higher uncertainty induces individuals 
to consider additional information before making judgments and decisions (e.g., Lerman, 2010; 
and McGee and Sawyerr, 2003). Therefore, when analyst forecast dispersion is high rather than 
low, I predict that earnings volatility will be given more weight by investors, and will exert 
stronger influence on their uncertainty judgments. This pattern implies that investors are 
expected to act as if they do not consider the likelihood of herding when making uncertainty 
judgments. I also predict that the effects of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility on 
investors’ uncertainty judgments will, in turn, impact investors’ willingness to invest in the firm.      
In order to test my predictions, I run a 2 x 2 between-participants experiment in which I 
manipulate analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility. Eighty-five graduate business 
students participate as proxies for reasonably-informed investors. Participants receive two charts 
side-by-side on the same page. One chart illustrates the firm’s annual earnings per share (EPS) 
for the previous six years, where earnings volatility is either low or high. The other chart 
illustrates five analyst forecasts of the firm’s EPS for the current year, where analyst forecast 
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dispersion is either low or high. Next, participants provide their own forecasts of the firm’s EPS, 
and assessments of uncertainty about future earnings and their willingness to invest in the firm. I 
supplement this between-participants design with an additional within-participants manipulation. 
In particular, participants then receive two other charts illustrating the same historical earnings 
but different analyst forecasts characterized by the opposite level of forecast dispersion. 
Participants then update their earnings forecasts, uncertainty judgments, and willingness to 
invest.  
Results are consistent with my predictions. When analyst forecast dispersion is low, 
investors estimate low uncertainty and high willingness to invest regardless of the level of 
earnings volatility. On the contrary, when analyst forecast dispersion is high, investors’ 
uncertainty judgments are positively influenced by earnings volatility, and their willingness to 
invest is negatively influenced by earnings volatility. Moreover, investors’ uncertainty judgments 
mediate the influence of earnings volatility on investors’ willingness to invest when analyst 
forecast dispersion is high. These results suggest that investors react as if they do not consider 
the likelihood of analyst herding when estimating uncertainty based on forecast dispersion and 
earnings volatility. In additional analyses, results of the within-participants manipulation of 
analyst forecast dispersion suggest that investors are at least partially unaware of how forecast 
dispersion and earnings volatility jointly influence their judgments.  
My study contributes to the literature on the determinants of forecasters’ uncertainty 
judgments. Previous studies examine the effect of either expert forecast dispersion or the 
volatility of the forecasted variable on forecasters’ uncertainty judgments. My study extends that 
research by investigating the joint influence of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility 
on investors’ judgments of uncertainty about future earnings, to gain insights about whether 
9 
 
investors’ uncertainty judgments are likely to be influenced by their perceptions about the 
likelihood of analyst herding. Results show that analyst forecast dispersion moderates the 
influence of earnings volatility on investors’ uncertainty judgments. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background research 
and develops my hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the experimental design and method and 
Section 4 presents the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Background and Hypotheses Development  
2.2.1 Investors’ Reactions to Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Earnings Volatility 
Prior research shows that investors react to both analyst forecast dispersion (Barron and 
Steurke, 1998; and Lerman, 2010) and earnings volatility (Blume and Friend, 1978; and Frankel 
and Litov, 2009) as measures of uncertainty about future earnings. Further, the market reacts 
unfavorably to increases in forecast dispersion and earnings volatility. For example, higher 
analyst forecast dispersion is associated with lower stock liquidity (Chung et al., 1995; and 
Roulstone, 2003), weaker stock price reactions to management’s confirming earnings forecasts 
(Clement, Frankel, and Miller, 2003), and weaker reactions by mutual funds to analyst forecast 
revisions (Brown, Wei, and Wermers, 2009). Further, higher earnings volatility is associated 
with higher cost of capital and lower market value of equity (Allayannis and Weston, 2003; 
Barnes, 2003; Francis et al. 2004; and Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin, 2000).  
These results are consistent with findings in the psychology and accounting literatures on 
the determinants of forecasters’ uncertainty judgments. Prior studies show that forecasters 
perceive higher uncertainty as expert forecast dispersion (Budescu and Rantilla, 2000; Budescu 
et al., 2003; and Budescu and Yu, 2007) and the volatility of the forecasted variable (Du and 
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Budescu, 2007; Eggleton, 1982; Lawrence and Makridakis, 1989; O’Connor, 1987; and 
O’Connor and Lawrence, 1992) increase. My study extends this line of research by examining 
the joint influence of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility on investors’ judgments 
of uncertainty about future earnings. By examining that influence, the study is intended to 
provide insights about whether investors react as if they consider the likelihood of analyst 
herding when making uncertainty judgments, as described in the next section.  
2.2.2 Investors’ Information Preferences and Estimating Uncertainty about Future 
Earnings 
In this section, I argue that analyst forecast dispersion will moderate the influence of 
earnings volatility on investors’ uncertainty judgments. Specifically, I argue that investors will 
be inclined to estimate uncertainty about future earnings based on analyst forecast dispersion and 
that the level of forecast dispersion will impact the weight that investors place on earnings 
volatility as a measure of uncertainty.  
 Prior research shows that reasonably-informed non-professional investors rely 
extensively on summary information obtained from analysts, such as earnings forecasts and 
stock recommendations, to make investment judgments and decisions (Blume and Friend, 1978; 
Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 2007; and SRI International, 1987). Other studies reveal that when 
these investors have access to information from multiple sources, they prefer to use summary 
information produced by experts such as analysts and firm managers. For example, using 
archival data obtained from a firm’s investor relations website, Hodge and Pronk (2006) show 
that non-professional investors prefer to access management’s discussion and analysis, in which 
managers summarize and provide their insights about the results, rather than to view the detailed 
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financial statements. These findings suggest that investors may be aware of the increased 
difficulty they face (Elliott et al., 2007) and the lower returns they achieve (Elliott, Hodge, and 
Jackson, 2008) when making judgments and decisions based on detailed financial statement 
information rather than summary information produced by experts.  
Moreover, researchers suggest that investors may prefer to rely on expert forecasts rather 
than statistical model forecasts because the former forecasts are based on a richer information set 
and are more forward-looking (Blattberg and Hoch, 1990; and Önkal et al., 2009). Using an 
experimental study, Önkal et al. show that investors’ stock price forecasts are more strongly 
influenced by experimenter-provided forecasts when the source of the latter forecasts is 
described as a human expert (i.e., an analyst) rather than a statistical model applied to past prices. 
In addition, investors are likely to be aware that analysts have access to more information about 
the firm, and are more able to analyze that information, compared to investors themselves. For 
example, Brazel, Jones, and Warne (2010) survey non-professional investors and find that they 
depend on analysts, among other parties, to detect and report financial statement fraud.   
Based on the previous studies, I predict that when investors have access to both analyst 
forecasts and historical earnings, investors will be inclined to rely more heavily on analyst 
forecasts to make their judgments and decisions. More specifically, investors will be more likely 
to estimate uncertainty about future earnings based on analyst forecast dispersion compared to 
earnings volatility. Next, I argue that the weight placed on earnings volatility as a measure of 
uncertainty will depend on the level of analyst forecast dispersion.   
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2.2.3 The Effect of Earnings Volatility on Investors’ Uncertainty Judgments 
Psychology research shows that higher expert (e.g., analyst) forecast dispersion leads 
forecast users (e.g., investors) to estimate higher uncertainty about the forecasted variable (e.g., 
future earnings) (Budescu and Rantilla, 2000; Budescu et al., 2003; and Budescu and Yu, 2007). 
Further, prior studies find that higher uncertainty induces individuals to consider additional 
information and engage in more extensive analysis of that information before making judgments 
and decisions. For example, as uncertainty about future earnings increases, individual investors 
participate in more discussions of firm-related information (Wysocki 1998), especially 
accounting information (Lerman, 2010), through online financial message boards.  
Moreover, survey evidence shows that firm managers collect and analyze more 
information about the business environment as they perceive higher strategic uncertainty (Choo 
and Auster, 1993; Jogaratnam and Wong, 2009; and McGee and Sawyerr, 2003). In addition, 
researchers suggest that higher expert forecast dispersion leads forecast users (e.g., investors) to 
estimate a higher probability that experts have differential access to information or that they rely 
on different forecasting methods to prepare their forecasts (Broomell and Budescu, 2009; 
Mumpower and Stewart, 1996; and Shanteau, 2001).  
Based on the previous studies, I expect investors to pay more attention to historical 
earnings information, and to place more weight on earnings volatility as a measure of 
uncertainty, when analyst forecast dispersion is high rather than low. Therefore, the influence of 
earnings volatility (i.e., the increase in investors’ uncertainty judgments when earnings volatility 
is high rather than low) will be greater when analyst forecast dispersion is high compared to low. 
The previous discussion leads to the following hypothesis which is illustrated in figure 1.  
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H1: The effect of earnings volatility on investors’ judgments of uncertainty about future 
earnings will be greater when analyst forecast dispersion is high rather than when analyst 
forecast dispersion is low.  
2.2.4 Investors’ Willingness to Invest 
The first hypothesis predicts the joint influence of analyst forecast dispersion and 
earnings volatility on investors’ uncertainty judgments. Prior literature also suggests that 
investors’ uncertainty judgments will influence their willingness to invest. Researchers argue that 
perceived uncertainty about a certain belief reduces the willingness, or commitment, to act based 
on that belief (Budescu et al., 2003; and Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Consistent with this 
argument, Hirst, Koonce, and Miller (1999) find that investors’ uncertainty about forecasted 
earnings is negatively associated with their willingness to buy the firm’s stock. Similarly, 
Bloomfield, Libby, and Nelson (1999) show that higher uncertainty induces investors to estimate 
less extreme security values and, as a result, to engage in less trading in these securities.  
Based on these findings, I expect the joint influence of analyst forecast dispersion and 
earnings volatility on investors’ uncertainty judgments to extend to their willingness to invest. 
Specifically, I predict that the influence of earnings volatility (i.e., the decrease in investors’ 
willingness to invest when earnings volatility is high rather than low) will be greater when 
analyst forecast dispersion is high as opposed to low. Consequently, I make the following 
hypothesis which is illustrated in figure 2.    
H2: The effect of earnings volatility on investors’ willingness to invest in the firm will be 
greater when analyst forecast dispersion is high compared to when analyst forecast 
dispersion is low.   
14 
 
 The first two hypotheses predict that investors’ uncertainty judgments and their 
willingness to invest will be more strongly influenced by earnings volatility when analyst 
forecast dispersion is high rather than low. Therefore, I expect investors’ uncertainty judgments 
to mediate the influence of earnings volatility on investors’ willingness to invest when analyst 
forecast dispersion is high. 
H3: When analyst forecast dispersion is high, investors’ judgments of uncertainty about 
future earnings will mediate the influence of earnings volatility on investors’ willingness 
to invest in the firm.      
2.3 Experimental Design and Method 
2.3.1 Participants 
Eighty-five graduate business students who were registered for a financial statement 
analysis class at a large mid-western state university participated in the study as proxies for 
reasonably-informed investors. Graduate business students who have completed or are registered 
for a financial statement analysis class have been found to be appropriate proxies for reasonably-
informed non-professional investors, especially in tasks characterized by a low level of 
integrative complexity like my experimental task (Elliott et al., 2007). Participants have 
completed an average of 8.98 (3.25) Accounting (Finance) classes. Fifty-three percent of 
participants have invested in common stock or mutual funds while 99 percent report that they 
plan to invest in common stock or mutual funds in the future. These statistics suggest that 
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participants possessed relevant experience and knowledge to respond meaningfully to my 
experimental materials.1  
2.3.2 Case Materials and Procedures 
Experimental materials were divided into three numbered envelopes (see appendix 1). At 
the beginning of each experimental session, participants were instructed to open the envelopes 
one by one in order. They were asked to return the contents of each envelope back to it and close 
it before opening the next envelope. In Envelope 1, participants read information about ABC 
Corporation, a mid-sized firm that operates in the chemicals industry.2 Background information 
described the firm’s products and markets, and was adapted from a real firm in the chemicals 
industry. Next, participants viewed two charts, side-by-side, on the same page. One chart 
presented the firm’s historical annual EPS for the previous six years (20X1 – 20X6). The other 
chart presented five analyst forecasts of the firm’s EPS for the current year that ends on 
December 31st, 20X7.3   
In all experimental conditions, the materials revealed that the consensus (i.e., mean) and 
median analyst forecast for 20X7 were equal to the firm’s mean EPS over the period 20X1 – 
20X6 of $0.97. This equality aims at reducing the variability in participants’ earnings forecasts to 
                                                            
1 When included as covariates in the analyses, none of participants’ characteristics discussed in this section 
influences the findings reported in the results section. 
2 I select the chemicals industry because Dichev and Tang (2009, p. 174) show that the firms operating in this 
industry are reasonably distributed across the different quintiles of earnings volatility. Therefore, both low and high 
earnings volatility are common in this industry. This should enhance the reasonableness of my earnings volatility 
manipulation. 
3 I presented the two charts side-by-side on the same page, and counterbalanced the position of each chart on the 
page (left or right), to ensure that participants acquire the two types of information simultaneously rather than 
sequentially. Psychology research demonstrates that when information is acquired sequentially, the order of 
information acquisition may induce either recency effects (Feldman et al., 1976; and Krosnick, Li, and Lehman, 
1990) or primacy effects (Brekke and Borgida, 1988). Presenting the two charts side-by-side on the same page and 
counterbalancing the position on the page should decrease the possibility that either recency or primacy effects 
explain participants’ judgments. 
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reduce the noise in the dependent variables and allow for the best opportunity to detect the 
predicted influence of the manipulated variables.4 To further limit the noise in the dependent 
variables, the materials informed participants that the period 20X1 – 20X7 was characterized by 
stable macroeconomic conditions. After viewing the two charts presenting historical EPS and 
analyst forecasts, participants provided their own forecasts of the firm’s EPS for 20X7, and 
assessments of their uncertainty about future earnings (measured by their confidence in their 
forecasts) and their willingness to invest in the firm.   
Envelope 2 included a number of post-experimental questions. Envelope 3 included a 
within-participants manipulation of analyst forecast dispersion, which is described in the 
additional analysis section, as well as demographic questions about participants, their 
background coursework, and their investment experience.      
2.3.3 Independent Variables 
In Envelope 1, both earnings volatility and analyst forecast dispersion were manipulated 
between-participants through the charts that presented historical EPS and analyst forecasts, 
respectively.  Earnings volatility was manipulated at two levels: low and high. Annual EPS for 
20X6 was set equal to the consensus analyst forecast for 20X7 in all experimental conditions. 
This is because research documents that investors react differently to good as opposed to bad 
earnings news (Hutton, Miller, and Skinner, 2003). By equating annual EPS for 20X6 to the 
consensus analyst forecast for 20X7, the expected change in earnings should be zero. This should 
eliminate the influence of the earnings news type on investors’ judgments. Annual EPS numbers 
                                                            
4 The downside of equating the consensus and median analyst forecasts to the mean historical EPS is that it may 
reduce participants’ uncertainty about 20X7 EPS. However, this effect, if present, should be equal across all 
experimental conditions. Therefore, it is unlikely to explain my predicted interaction.  
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for 20X1 – 20X5 in the low volatility conditions were selected such that the mean EPS for 20X1 
– 20X6 is equal to the consensus analyst forecast for 20X7. The deviations of annual EPS 
numbers for 20X1 – 20X5 from their mean were multiplied by 15 and added back to the mean to 
obtain the corresponding annual EPS numbers in the high volatility conditions. Further, annual 
EPS numbers were ordered in a manner that emphasizes the change in earnings from one year to 
the next without exhibiting a clear upward or downward trend over the 20X1 – 20X6 period.     
Annual EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 had a coefficient of variation (i.e., standard 
deviation/mean) of 0.04 (0.60) in the low (high) volatility conditions. To ensure that these values 
reflect meaningful variation in earnings volatility, I obtained a sample of annual EPS data from 
COMPUSTAT for 2004 – 2009.5 The sample shows that the value 0.04 (0.60) belongs to the 1st 
(55th) percentile of the distribution of the coefficient of variation of annual EPS. Also, the firm’s 
annual EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 consist of a series of profits only, with no losses. I do not include 
losses because investors value loss firms in different ways than they value profit firms (Collings, 
Pincus, and Xie, 1999; and Darrough and Ye, 2007) and because investors react strongly to firms 
that swing between profits and losses (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Both factors may be 
confounded with the influence of earnings volatility on investors’ judgments if the firm’s 
historical EPS included losses. 
Analyst forecast dispersion was manipulated at two levels: low and high. In each 
condition, I create a symmetric distribution of analyst forecasts by distributing the individual 
                                                            
5 I focus on basic EPS – excluding extraordinary items (EPSPX) data obtained from the North America 
Fundamentals Annual file. I apply the following sample selection criteria: annual EPS numbers must be available for 
the whole 6-year period and must all be positive. I also exclude firms with total assets less than $100 million to 
focus on economically substantial firms, consistent with Dichev and Tang (2009).  The final sample includes 2,799 
firm observations.  
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forecasts evenly over the forecast range.6 However, I place high and low forecasts next to each 
other in the chart to emphasize their dispersion. In order to obtain individual analyst forecasts in 
the high dispersion conditions, deviations of individual analyst forecasts from their mean in the 
low dispersion conditions were multiplied by 15 and added back to the mean. Analyst forecasts 
had a coefficient of variation of 0.02 (0.24) in the low (high) dispersion conditions. To ensure 
that these values reflect meaningful variation in analyst forecast dispersion, I obtained a sample 
of analyst forecasts of annual EPS from IBES for 2004 – 2009.7 The sample shows that the value 
of 0.02 (0.24) belongs to the 31st (91st) percentile of the distribution of the coefficient of variation 
of analyst forecasts.  
2.3.4 Dependent Measures 
Based on Kahneman and Tversky (1982), one way to assess uncertainty judgments is by 
eliciting participants’ experienced confidence. Therefore, I measured participants’ estimates of 
uncertainty about future earnings by asking them to rate their confidence in their own forecasts 
of the firm’s EPS for 20X7. Participants responded to the question: “How confident are you in 
your own forecast?” on a 7-point scale where 1 = “Not at All Confident” and 7 = “Very 
Confident”. Responses are reverse-coded to measure uncertainty judgments.  
Participants expressed their willingness to invest in the firm by responding to the 
following two questions: “I believe ABC is an attractive investment” (Q1) and “I am willing to 
                                                            
6 Research shows that, compared to non-bold analyst forecasts, bold analyst forecasts exert stronger influence on 
investors’ judgments (Bloomfield and Hales, 2009; and Kadous, Mercer, and Thayer, 2009). Creating symmetric 
distributions of analyst forecasts should prevent participants from considering any individual analyst forecast to be 
bolder than the others. This should ensure the effectiveness of the analyst forecast dispersion manipulation.   
7 I obtained the sample from the IBES summary file by applying the following sample selection criteria: forecasts 
are made for one-year-ahead earnings (forecast period indicator =1), the number of estimates (i.e., individual analyst 
forecasts) is greater than 1, and the mean analyst forecast is positive. The final sample includes 212,165 
observations.   
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invest in ABC’s stock” (Q2) on 7-point scales where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 7 = “Strongly 
Agree”. I calculate average responses to the two questions to measure participants’ willingness to 
invest and use that average to test my hypotheses.  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Manipulation Checks 
To assess the effectiveness of the earnings volatility manipulation, I asked participants to 
rate earnings volatility on a 7-point scale where 1 = “Very Low” and 7 = “Very High”. 
Participants in the low volatility conditions rated earnings volatility lower than participants in the 
high volatility conditions (means of 2.98 and 6.09 respectively; F = 135.62, p < 0.01, one-tailed). 
Similarly, to assess the effectiveness of the analyst forecast dispersion manipulation, I asked 
participants to rate the extent to which analysts agreed on the firm’s forecasted EPS for 20X7 on 
a 7-point scale where 1 = “Very Low Agreement” and 7 = “Very High Agreement”. The 
construct of agreement is negatively related to the construct of dispersion; lower agreement 
means higher dispersion. Participants in the low dispersion conditions rated the level of 
agreement among analysts higher than participants in the high dispersion conditions (means of 
5.21 and 2.47, respectively; F= 97.56, p < 0.01, one-tailed). These results suggest that both the 
earnings volatility and the analyst forecast dispersion manipulations were effective.   
2.4.2 Tests of Hypotheses 
2.4.2.1 Test of H1  
H1 predicts that the effect of earnings volatility on investors’ uncertainty judgments (i.e., 
the increase in uncertainty when earnings volatility is high rather than low) will be greater when 
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analyst forecast dispersion is high rather than low.8 Panel A of table 1 presents means (standard 
deviations) of participants’ uncertainty judgments (see figure 3). Since H1 predicts an ordinal 
interaction between earnings volatility and analyst forecast dispersion, contrast coding is the 
most appropriate way to test H1. Using contrast codes enhances statistical power compared to 
the interaction tested in conventional Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) without increasing the 
associated Type I error rates (Buckless and Ravenscroft, 1990).  
Consistent with my predictions, I test H1 using the following set of contrast weights:  -2, 
-2, +1, +3 for low dispersion/low volatility, low dispersion/high volatility, high dispersion/low 
volatility, and high dispersion/high volatility respectively. This contrast tests whether the impact 
of earnings volatility (i.e., the increase in investors’ uncertainty judgments when earnings 
volatility is high rather than low) is stronger when analyst forecast dispersion is high rather than 
low. The ordinal interaction tested by such a contrast consists of mainly two simple effects: the 
simple effect of earnings volatility given high analyst forecast dispersion, and the simple effect 
of analyst forecast dispersion given high earnings volatility (Dawes, 1988, p. 212-214). For 
completeness, I also examine whether, as implied by my contrast, the simple effect of analyst 
forecast dispersion given low earnings volatility is significant and the simple effect of earnings 
volatility given low analyst forecast dispersion is insignificant. (cf., Buckless and Ravenscroft, 
1990, p. 940-942; and Elliott, Krische, and Peecher, 2010).   
                                                            
8 The overall mean of investors’ earnings forecasts is $1.01. As expected, investors’ earnings forecasts do not differ 
significantly across experimental conditions. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of participants’ forecasts reveals 
that the main effects of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility and the analyst forecast dispersion * 
earnings volatility interaction are all insignificant (all F ≤ 1.65, all p ≥ 0.21, two-tailed).  Further, all results of 
testing my hypotheses are inferentially identical to the results reported in this section when including as a covariate 
participants’ earnings forecasts or the position of the charts presenting historical earnings and analyst forecasts on 
the page (left or right).     
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Panel B of table 1 reports that the -2, -2, +1, +3 contrast is significant (F = 9.00, p <0.01, 
one-tailed). Panel B also shows that for high analyst forecast dispersion, investors’ uncertainty 
was higher when earnings volatility was high rather than low (F = 5.13, p = 0.01, one-tailed). 
Further, for high earnings volatility, investors’ uncertainty was higher when analyst forecast 
dispersion was high rather than low (F = 5.77, p = 0.01, one-tailed). For completeness, I also 
report that for low earnings volatility, investors’ uncertainty judgments were directionally higher 
when analyst forecast dispersion was high rather than low; however, the difference was not 
statistically significant (F = 0.91, p = 0.17, one-tailed). Further, for low analyst forecast 
dispersion, investors’ uncertainty did not differ significantly when earnings volatility was high 
rather than low (F = 0.67, p = 0.42, two-tailed). Overall, these results support the ordinal 
interaction between analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility predicted in H1.9, 10  
2.4.2.2 Test of H2  
H2 predicts that the effect of earnings volatility on investors’ willingness to invest in the 
firm (i.e., the decrease in willingness to invest when earnings volatility is high rather than low) 
                                                            
9 I verify that results for H1 are robust to alternative sets of contrast weights such as: -1, -1, -1, 3 for low 
dispersion/low volatility, low dispersion/high volatility, high dispersion/low volatility, and high dispersion/high 
volatility respectively (F = 10.52, p <0.01, one-tailed). This set of contrast weights is more restrictive than my 
original set of contrast weights by not allowing for a significant simple effect of analyst forecast dispersion given 
low earnings volatility.  
10 This ordinal interaction is also consistent with an alternative explanation: that investors estimate uncertainty based 
on earnings volatility and place more weight on forecast dispersion when earnings volatility is high rather than low. 
Data collected in a pre-test of my first study can help rule out this alternative explanation. Pre-test participants were 
asked to explain the reasons behind their uncertainty judgments and earnings forecasts. Out of 107 graduate business 
student participants, 74 participants provided justifications for their uncertainty judgments, with 84 percent (62/74) 
referring to forecast dispersion and only 55 percent (41/74) referring to earnings volatility in their justifications 
(untabulated). To distinguish between alternative explanations, I analyze the likelihood of participants’ referring to 
each uncertainty measure conditional on the level of the other measure. Results show that participants were more 
likely to refer to earnings volatility when analyst forecast dispersion was high rather than low (66% (27/41) vs. 42% 
(14/33); Fisher’s Exact Test: p = 0.06, two-tailed). On the contrary, participants were not more likely to refer to 
analyst forecast dispersion when earnings volatility was high compared to low (87% (33/38) vs. 81% (29/36); 
Fisher’s Exact Test: p = 0.54, two-tailed). These results do not support the alternative interpretation; instead, 
consistent with my expectations, participants are inclined to estimate uncertainty based on analyst forecast 
dispersion and they place more weight on earnings volatility when forecast dispersion is high rather than low. 
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will be stronger when analyst forecast dispersion is high rather than low. Participants expressed 
their willingness to invest in the firm by responding to two questions (Q1 and Q2) as explained 
before. I test H2 using the average of participants’ responses to the two questions.11 
Panel A of table 2 presents means (standard deviations) of participants’ willingness to 
invest as well as their responses to Q1 and Q2 (see figure 4). Consistent with my predictions, I 
test H2 using the following set of contrast weights: +2, +2, -1, -3 for low dispersion/low 
volatility, low dispersion/high volatility, high dispersion/low volatility, and high dispersion/high 
volatility respectively. Results reported in panel B of table 2 reveal that the +2, +2, -1, -3 contrast 
is significant (F = 5.32, p = 0.01, one-tailed). Follow-up simple effect tests show that, for high 
analyst forecast dispersion, investors’ willingness to invest was lower when earnings volatility 
was high rather than low (F = 3.10, p = 0.04, one-tailed). Further, for high earnings volatility, 
investors’ willingness to invest was lower when analyst forecast dispersion was high rather than 
low (F = 4.58, p = 0.02, one-tailed). For completeness, I also report that for low earnings 
volatility, investors’ willingness to invest was directionally lower when analyst forecast 
dispersion was high as opposed to low; however, the difference was not statistically significant 
(F = 0.19, p = 0.33, one-tailed). Finally, for low analyst forecast dispersion, investors’ 
willingness to invest did not differ significantly when earnings volatility was high rather than 
low (F = 0.00, p = 0.95, two-tailed). Overall, these results support the ordinal interaction 
predicted in H2.12   
                                                            
11 Results are inferentially identical analyzing instead responses to each of Q1 and Q2 separately, performing factor 
analysis on responses to the two questions and analyzing the resulting factor, or analyzing responses to the two 
questions using a multivariate contrast.   
12 I also verify that results for H2 are robust to alternative sets of contrast weights such as: +1, +1, +1, -3 for low 
dispersion/low volatility, low dispersion/high volatility, high dispersion/low volatility, and high dispersion/high 
volatility respectively (F = 6.28, p = 0.01, one-tailed). 
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2.4.2.3 Test of H3 
 The first two hypotheses predict that earnings volatility will exert a stronger effect on 
investors’ uncertainty judgments and willingness to invest when analyst forecast dispersion is 
high rather than low. Consistent with this, H3 predicts that investors’ uncertainty judgments will 
mediate the influence of earnings volatility on their willingness to invest when analyst forecast 
dispersion is high. I test H3 using the 43 participants in the high dispersion conditions only. 
Based on Baron and Kenny (1986), the following conditions must hold to establish the predicted 
mediation relation. First, the main effect of earnings volatility must be significant for investors’ 
uncertainty judgments. Second, the main effect of earnings volatility must be significant for 
investors’ willingness to invest. Third, when all variables are included in the model, the 
explanatory power of investors’ uncertainty judgments for their willingness to invest must retain 
significance and the explanatory power of earnings volatility for investors’ willingness to invest 
must be reduced.  
 Panel A of table 3 presents results of an ANOVA for testing the first mediation condition. 
Results reveal that the main effect of earnings volatility is significant for investors’ uncertainty 
judgments (F = 4.93, p = 0.03, two-tailed). Panel B of table 3 presents results of an ANOVA for 
testing the second mediation condition. Results show that the main effect of earnings volatility is 
significant for investors’ willingness to invest (F = 3.83, p = 0.06, two-tailed). Finally, panel C of 
table 3 presents results of an ANOVA for testing the third mediation condition. Results reveal 
that when all variables are included in the model, investors’ uncertainty judgments continue to 
influence their willingness to invest (F = 8.24, p < 0.01, two-tailed). Further, the main effect of 
earnings volatility is no longer significant for investors’ willingness to invest (F = 1.13, p = 0.29, 
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two-tailed). Overall, these results support the mediating role of investors’ uncertainty judgments 
predicted in H3.13      
 To summarize, results of testing my hypotheses reveal that, as predicted, analyst forecast 
dispersion moderates the influence of earnings volatility on investors’ uncertainty judgments and 
willingness to invest. When analyst forecast dispersion is low, investors estimate low uncertainty 
and high willingness to invest regardless of earnings volatility. On the contrary, when analyst 
forecast dispersion is high, investors’ uncertainty judgments are positively influenced by 
earnings volatility, and their willingness to invest is negatively influenced by earnings volatility. 
Further, investors’ uncertainty judgments mediate the influence of earnings volatility on their 
willingness to invest when analyst forecast dispersion is high. 
2.4.3 Additional Analyses: Intentionality of Investors’ Reactions 
 As predicted, earnings volatility exerts a stronger influence on investors’ uncertainty 
judgments and willingness to invest when analyst forecast dispersion is high rather than low. To 
gain a better understanding of investors’ thought process, I examine whether investors’ reactions 
to analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility are intentional or unintentional. If investors’ 
reactions are unintentional, future research may investigate ways to raise investors’ awareness of 
their own reactions and examine whether increased awareness will lead investors to change these 
reactions.  
 If investors’ reactions to analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility are 
intentional, these reactions are expected to persist when analyst forecast dispersion changes 
                                                            
13 Untabulated analyses reveal that the mediation relation predicted in H3 does not hold when analyst forecast 
dispersion is low. The main effect of earnings volatility is insignificant for investors’ uncertainty judgments (F = 
0.70, p = 0.41, two-tailed) and willingness to invest (F = 0.00, p = 0.95, two-tailed), which means that the first and 
second conditions for mediation are not satisfied when analyst forecast dispersion is low.   
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explicitly (i.e., when it is manipulated within-participants) (Elliott, Krische, and Peecher, 2010; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1996; Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson, 2002; Tan, Libby, and Hunton, 
2002). Thus, when forecast dispersion changes from low to high in the within-participants 
manipulation, earnings volatility should be given more weight by investors and should exert a 
stronger influence on their judgments. As a result, investors’ uncertainty should increase more, 
and their willingness to invest should decrease more, when earnings volatility is high rather than 
low. Conversely, when forecast dispersion changes from high to low in the within-participants 
manipulation, earnings volatility should be given less weight by investors, and should exert less 
influence on their judgments. In that case, investors’ uncertainty should decrease more, and their 
willingness to invest should increase more, when earnings volatility is high rather than low.   
 I added a within-participants manipulation of analyst forecast dispersion, to examine the 
intentionality of investors’ reactions, at the end of the experimental task. In Envelope 3 of the 
experimental materials, participants received alternative analyst forecasts of the firm’s EPS for 
20X7. These forecasts were characterized by the opposite level of dispersion compared to the 
initial analyst forecasts that participants received in Envelope 1. Participants then updated their 
own forecasts, uncertainty judgments, and willingness to invest. I examine my expectations 
about investors’ reactions using the change in participants’ uncertainty judgments and 
willingness to invest (i.e., updated judgments – initial judgments).  
 Untabulated non-parametric ANOVAs of the change in investors’ uncertainty judgments 
and willingness to invest reveal only a significant main effect of the change in analyst forecast 
dispersion (for change in uncertainty judgments: F = 49.78, p <0.01, two-tailed; for change in 
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willingness to invest: F = 15.98, p <0.01, two-tailed ).14 The main effect of earnings volatility 
and the change in the analyst forecast dispersion * earnings volatility interaction were 
insignificant (for change in uncertainty judgments: all F ≤ 0.16, all p ≥ 0.69, two-tailed; for 
change in willingness to invest: all F ≤ 0.37, all p ≥ 0.55, two-tailed). Further, follow-up simple 
effect tests reveal that the simple effect of earnings volatility was insignificant for both directions 
of the change in analyst forecast dispersion (for change in uncertainty judgments: all F ≤ 0.30, all 
p ≥ 0.58, two-tailed; for change in willingness to invest: all F ≤ 0.65, all p ≥ 0.42, two-
tailed).15,16  
 This indicates that earnings volatility does not affect the change in investors’ uncertainty 
judgments and willingness to invest when analyst forecast dispersion is manipulated within-
participants. The difference between these within-participants results and the between-
participants results suggest that the between-participants reactions are unintentional (Libby, 
Bloomfield, and Nelson, 2002). This implies that investors are at least partially unaware of how 
analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility jointly influence their uncertainty judgments 
and willingness to invest.   
                                                            
14 Using the Levene’s test, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was rejected for the change in investors’ 
uncertainty judgments (F = 4.68, p <0.01, two-tailed) and the change in their willingness to invest (F = 2.65, p = 
0.05, two-tailed). Therefore, I discuss results of non-parametric tests in this section. Results of parametric tests are 
inferentially identical to those of non-parametric tests.  
15 Results are inferentially identical when performing repeated-measures ANOVAs for participants’ initial and 
updated uncertainty judgments and willingness to invest. 
16 The overall mean of the change in investors’ earnings forecasts (i.e., updated forecasts – initial forecasts) is              
$-0.03. As expected, the change in investors’ forecasts is not significantly different across experimental conditions. 
An ANOVA of the change in investors’ forecasts reveals that the main effects of the change in forecast dispersion 
and earnings volatility, and the change in forecast dispersion * earnings volatility interaction are all insignificant (all 
F ≤ 1.47, all p ≥ 0.23, two-tailed). Further, all the results related to the change in investors’ uncertainty judgments 
and willingness to invest are inferentially identical to the results reported in this section when the change in 
investors’ forecasts is included as a covariate in the model. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
My first study investigates the joint influence of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings 
volatility on investors’ uncertainty and willingness to invest. Results show that when analyst 
forecast dispersion is low, investors estimate low uncertainty and high willingness to invest 
regardless of earnings volatility. On the contrary, when analyst forecast dispersion is high, 
investors’ uncertainty judgments are positively influenced by earnings volatility, and their 
willingness to invest is negatively influenced by earnings volatility. Further, investors’ 
uncertainty judgments mediate the influence of earnings volatility on their willingness to invest 
when analyst forecast dispersion is high. 
This study was designed to provide insights about whether investors react as if they 
consider the likelihood of analyst herding when estimating uncertainty about future earnings 
based on forecast dispersion and earnings volatility. However, one limitation of the study is that 
variations in the manipulated variables do not have to influence investors’ estimates of the 
likelihood of analyst herding. Rather, when encountering low forecast dispersion and high 
earnings volatility, investors may conclude that analysts possess common information that leads 
them to agree on forecasted earnings, which results in low forecast dispersion regardless of the 
level of earnings volatility. Therefore, the finding that low analyst forecast dispersion leads 
investors to estimate low uncertainty regardless of the level of earnings volatility does not 
necessarily imply that investors react as if they do not consider the likelihood of analyst herding. 
A second limitation of the study is that I do not measure investors’ estimates of the likelihood of 
analyst herding directly.  
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Based on these limitations, I design and conduct a second study that investigates more 
directly whether investors consider the likelihood of analyst herding when making uncertainty 
judgments. As the likelihood of analyst herding is greater when analyst forecast dispersion is low 
rather than high, my second study focuses on a case of low analyst forecast dispersion. Further, I 
manipulate the preference-consistency and temporal order of analyst forecasts, two factors that 
are expected to exert a strong influence on investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst 
herding. In addition, I measure investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding directly. 
The next chapter presents my second study.  
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2.6 Figures 
FIGURE 1 
Study 1: Predictions – Investors’ Uncertainty Judgments  
 
 
 
Figure 1 displays the predicted effects of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility on investors’ uncertainty 
judgments (H1). H1 predicts an ordinal interaction which can be tested using contrast weights such as -2, -2, +1, +3 
for low dispersion/low volatility, low dispersion/high volatility, high dispersion /low volatility, and high dispersion 
/high volatility, respectively. This interaction consists mainly of two simple effects: the simple effect of earnings 
volatility given high analyst forecast dispersion, and the simple effect of analyst forecast dispersion given high 
earnings volatility.  
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Low Volatility
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FIGURE 2 
Study 1: Predictions – Investors’ Willingness to Invest 
 
 
Figure 2 displays the predicted effects of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility on investors’ willingness 
to invest (H2). H2 predicts an ordinal interaction which can be tested using contrast weights such as +2, +2, -1, -3 
for low dispersion/low volatility, low dispersion/high volatility, high dispersion /low volatility, and high dispersion 
/high volatility, respectively. This interaction consists mainly of two simple effects: the simple effect of earnings 
volatility given high analyst forecast dispersion, and the simple effect of analyst forecast dispersion given high 
earnings volatility. 
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FIGURE 3 
Study 1: Results for H1 – Investors’ Uncertainty Judgments 
 
 
Figure 3 displays the observed pattern of participants’ uncertainty judgments (H1 – see panel A of table 1). This 
pattern is tested using the planned contrasts presented in panel B of table 1. 
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FIGURE 4 
Study 1: Results for H2 – Investors’ Willingness to Invest 
 
 
Figure 4 displays the observed pattern of participants’ willingness to invest (H2 – see panel A of table 2). This 
pattern is tested using the planned contrasts presented in panel B of table 2. 
3.83 
3.67 3.81 
3.00 
Low Dispersion High Dispersion
Low Volatility
High Volatility
33 
 
2.7 Tables 
TABLE 1 
Study 1: Test of H1 – Investors’ Uncertainty Judgments 
Panel A: Means [Standard Deviations] of Investors’ Uncertainty Judgments  
Analyst Forecast 
Dispersion Earnings Volatility n 
Investors’ Uncertainty 
Judgments 
Low Low 21 3.48 
[1.03] 
Low High 21 3.76 
[1.18] 
High Low 21 3.81 
[0.98] 
High High 22 4.59 
[1.30] 
 
Panel B: Planned Contrast Coding for H1 and Follow-up Simple Effect Tests Using 
Investors’ Uncertainty Judgments  
Source df F-ratio p-value 
Overall Test [H1]: 
 
The effect of earnings volatility on investors’ uncertainty 
judgments will be greater when analyst forecast 
dispersion is high compared to when analyst forecast 
dispersion is low  
 
Contrast weights [-2,-2,1,3] 
1 9.00 <0.01* 
Follow-up Simple Effect Tests    
Effect of volatility given high dispersion  1 5.13 0.01* 
Effect of dispersion given high volatility 1 5.77 0.01* 
Effect of dispersion given low volatility 1 0.91 0.17* 
Effect of volatility given low dispersion 1 0.67 0.42** 
    
In Envelope 1 of the experimental materials, each participant saw two charts side-by-side on the same page. One chart 
illustrated the firm’s historical earnings per share (EPS) for 20X1-20X6, where earnings volatility was either low or 
high. The other chart illustrated five analyst forecasts of the firm’s EPS for 20X7, where analyst forecast dispersion 
was either low or high. Next participants provided their own forecasts of the firm’s EPS for 20X7. Participants also 
estimated uncertainty about future earnings by rating their confidence in their own forecasts. They responded to the 
following question: “How confident are you in your own forecast?” on a 7-point scale where 1= “Not at all Confident” 
and 7= “Very Confident”. I reverse-code participants’ ratings to measure their uncertainty judgments and use these 
judgments to test H1.  
 
* One-tailed p-values given my directional hypotheses.  
** Two-tailed p-values.  
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TABLE 2 
Study 1: Test of H2 – Investors’ Willingness to Invest 
Panel A: Means [Standard Deviations] of Investors’ Willingness to Invest 
Analyst 
forecast 
Dispersion 
Earnings 
Volatility n 
Investors’ 
Willingness 
to Invest  Q1 Q2 
Low Low 21 3.83 
[1.48] 
3.95 
[1.47] 
3.71 
[1.59] 
Low High 21 3.81 
[1.22] 
3.95 
[1.24] 
3.67 
[1.28] 
High Low 21 3.67 
[0.95] 
3.81 
[0.98] 
3.52 
[1.08] 
High High 22 3.00 
[1.25] 
3.09 
[1.15] 
2.91 
[1.44] 
 
Panel B: Planned Contrast Coding for H2 and Follow-up Simple Effect Tests Using 
Investors’ Willingness to Invest  
Source df F-ratio p-value 
Overall Test [H2]: 
 
The effect of earnings volatility on investors’ willingness 
to invest will be greater when analyst forecast dispersion 
is high compared to when analyst forecast dispersion is 
low.   
 
Contrast weights [2, 2, -1, -3] 
1 5.32 0.01* 
Follow-up Simple Effect Tests    
Effect of volatility given high dispersion  1 3.10 0.04* 
Effect of dispersion given high volatility 1 4.58 0.02* 
Effect of dispersion given low volatility 1 0.19 0.33* 
Effect of volatility given low dispersion 1 0.00 0.95** 
    
See table 1 for a description of the earnings volatility and the analyst forecast dispersion manipulations.  
 
In Envelope 1 of the experimental materials, participants expressed their willingness to invest in the firm by 
responding to the following two questions: “I believe ABC is an attractive investment” (Q1) and “I am willing to 
invest in ABC’s stock” (Q2) on 7-point scales where 1= “Strongly Disagree” and 7= “Strongly Agree”. I measure 
participants’ willingness to invest by the average of their responses to the two questions and use that average to test 
H2.    
 
* One-tailed p-values given my directional hypotheses.  
** Two-tailed p-values. 
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TABLE 3 
Study 1: Test of H3 
Panel A: ANOVA Model of Investors’ Uncertainty Judgments  
Source df 
Mean-
Square F-ratio p-value* 
Volatility 1 6.56 4.93 0.03 
Error 41 1.33   
Corrected Total 42    
 
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Investors’ Willingness to Invest 
Source df 
Mean-
Square F-ratio p-value* 
Volatility 1 4.78 3.83 0.06 
Error 41 1.25   
Corrected Total 42    
 
Panel C: ANOVA Model of Investors’ Willingness to Invest Using their Uncertainty 
Judgments as an Independent Variable 
Source df 
Mean-
Square F-ratio p-value* 
Volatility 1 1.20 1.13 0.29 
Uncertainty  1 8.74 8.24 <0.01 
Error 40 1.06   
Corrected Total 42    
    
See table 1 for a description of the analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility manipulations and investors’ 
uncertainty judgments. See table 2 for a description of investors’ willingness to invest.  
 
I test H3 using the responses of participants in the high dispersion conditions only.  
 
* Two-tailed p-values.  
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2: THE JOINT INFLUENCE OF THE PREFERENCE-CONSISTENCY AND 
TEMPORAL ORDER OF ANALYST FORECASTS ON INVESTORS’ UNCERTAINTY 
JUDGMENTS 
3.1 Introduction 
My first study examines whether investors react as if they consider the likelihood of 
analyst herding when estimating uncertainty about future earnings based on analyst forecast 
dispersion and earnings volatility. However, as explained in the previous chapter, variations in 
the manipulated variables do not necessarily have to influence investors’ perceptions about the 
likelihood of analyst herding. In addition, I do not measure investors’ estimates of the likelihood 
of analyst herding directly in my first study. To address these limitations, I conduct a second 
study that examines conditions under which investors’ uncertainty judgments are expected to be 
influenced by their perceptions about the likelihood of analyst herding. In this study, I 
manipulate the temporal order and preference-consistency of analyst forecasts because 
examining the joint influence of these two factors on investor’ uncertainty judgments can 
provide a potential explanation for the mixed findings documented in prior research about 
investors’ reactions to the likelihood of analyst herding (e.g., Bloomfield and Hales, 2009; 
Cooper, Day, and Lewis, 2001; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010; and Olsen, 1996). Specifically, my 
second study examines how the temporal order of analyst forecasts (defined as whether analysts 
issue their forecasts at different times or the same time) influences investors’ estimates of the 
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likelihood of analyst herding and investors’ judgments of uncertainty about future earnings.17 
Further, the study investigates how that influence of temporal order may be moderated by the 
preference-consistency of analyst forecasts (defined as whether the earnings news conveyed by 
these forecasts is inconsistent or consistent with investors’ directional preferences).  
Based on Bloomfield and Hales (2009), Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001), and Shroff, 
Venkataraman, and Xin (2005), I infer that investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst 
herding are likely to be influenced by the temporal order of analyst forecasts. Psychology 
research suggests that when a leader analyst issues his/her forecast then follower analysts issue 
their confirming forecasts shortly afterwards, investors will conclude that follower analysts are 
copying the leader analyst forecast (e.g., Kelley and Michela, 1980; and Lagnado and Sloman, 
2006).In addition, investors are more likely to discount low analyst forecast dispersion when 
analyst forecasts are issued successively (i.e., with a leader’s forecast issued first) rather than 
concurrently (i.e. all forecasts issued at the same time) (e.g., Wilder, 1978). Therefore, I argue 
that investors’ estimates of uncertainty about future earnings will depend on whether analyst 
forecast are issued successively or concurrently.  
I infer from Olsen (1996) and Adut, Sen, and Sinha (2008) that investors’ estimates of the 
likelihood of analyst herding are also likely to be affected by investors’ directional preferences 
for the earnings news conveyed by analyst forecasts. Both Olsen and Adut et al. report a positive 
association between herding and optimism in analyst forecasts. Olsen also presents evidence 
suggesting that the market fails to react to analyst herding. These findings can be linked together 
based on research on motivated reasoning and skepticism (e.g., Ditto and Lopez, 1992). Analyst 
                                                            
17 I use the term ‘temporal order’ consistent with prior research such as Brown (1985), Einhorn and Hogarth (1986), 
and Lagnado and Sloman (2006). In these studies, temporal order refers to whether or not a potential cause precedes 
the effect in time.  
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forecasts are inconsistent (consistent) with investors’ directional preferences when these 
forecasts reveal earnings news indicating that investors will lose (make) money on their 
investments. Motivated reasoning suggests that investors will be motivated to scrutinize 
preference-inconsistent analyst forecasts in order to discredit these forecasts, and to accept 
preference-consistent analyst forecasts at face value.  
As a result, I predict that the preference-consistency of analyst forecasts will moderate 
the influence of temporal order on investors’ uncertainty judgments. The influence of temporal 
order (i.e., the increase in investors’ estimates of uncertainty when analysts issue their forecasts 
successively rather than concurrently) is expected to be stronger when analyst forecasts are 
preference-inconsistent rather than preference-consistent. Moreover, when analyst forecasts are 
preference –inconsistent, investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding are expected to 
mediate the influence of temporal order on investors’ uncertainty judgments.    
To test my predictions, I conduct an online experiment which manipulates the temporal 
order and preference-consistency of analyst forecasts between participants. Ninety-one graduate 
business students participate as proxies for reasonably-informed investors. Similar to Hales 
(2007) and Thayer (2011), participants are assigned to either a short or long position in a stock. 
They are informed that their payoffs will be partially determined depending on the stock’s 
performance, defined as how actual earnings per share (EPS) compare to an arbitrary benchmark. 
Participants who hold a short (long) position achieve higher payoffs as actual EPS fall short of 
(exceed) the benchmark. In addition, participants receive the forecasts made by three analysts 
who follow the firm, presented in tabular form, with the consensus forecast equal to the 
benchmark. At that point, participants provide initial uncertainty judgments.  
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Next, the three analysts revise upward their forecasts, such that the revised forecasts are 
higher than the benchmark. As a result, revised analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent 
(preference-consistent) for participants who hold a short (long) position in the stock. Moreover, 
the temporal order of revised analyst forecasts is manipulated between participants. In the 
successive forecasts condition, the leader analyst issues his/her revised forecast first and the 
follower analysts issue their revised forecasts one day later. In the concurrent forecasts condition, 
all analysts issue their revised forecasts on the same day. Next, participants update their 
uncertainty judgments and estimate the likelihood of analyst herding.   
Results are consistent with my predictions. When analyst forecasts are preference-
inconsistent, the temporal order of these forecasts influences investors’ uncertainty judgments, 
and that influence is mediated by investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding. In 
contrast, when analyst forecasts are preference-consistent, the temporal order of these forecasts 
does not influence investors’ uncertainty judgments or their estimates of the likelihood of analyst 
herding. Additional analyses repeat these tests for the dispersion of investors’ forecasts as a 
second measure of uncertainty, with some supporting evidence that the preference-consistency of 
analyst forecasts also moderates the influence of temporal order on the dispersion of investors’ 
forecasts.  
By examining factors that influence investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst 
herding and how these estimates impact investors’ judgments, this study makes two important 
contributions to the literature. First, this study provides a potential explanation for the extant 
conflicting findings on investors’ reactions to the likelihood of analyst herding by illustrating 
that the preference-consistency of analyst forecasts influences the extent to which investors react 
to perceived herding. Second, this study contributes to research on investors’ credulity by 
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illustrating that motivated reasoning and skepticism can be another mechanism, in addition to 
overconfidence and limited attention, that leads investors to be credulous about the incentives of 
informed market participants.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background research and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 discusses the research design and methodology. Section 4 
presents the results and Section 5 concludes the chapter.  
3.2 Background and Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Investors’ Reactions to Perceived Analyst Herding 
 Prior research in accounting, economics, and finance suggests that analysts sometimes 
herd their forecasts and recommendations (e.g., Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001; Clarke and 
Subramanian, 2006; Clement and Tse, 2005; and Welch, 2000). When analysts herd their 
forecasts, analyst forecast dispersion decreases even though uncertainty about future earnings 
does not change. Analyst forecast dispersion exerts a significant influence on investors’ 
judgments of the uncertainty about future earnings (Barron and Steurke, 1998; and Lerman, 
2010). Further, uncertainty judgments influence investors’ perceptions of a stock’s riskiness, 
selected discount rates to evaluate the stock, and investment decisions (Erickson, Wang, and 
Zhang, 2011; and Imhoff and Lobo, 1992). Thus, as analyst herding influences analyst forecast 
dispersion, it can exert a significant influence on investors’ judgments and decisions.  
 However, prior research presents inconsistent findings about investors’ reactions to the 
likelihood of analyst herding. In this section, I highlight these conflicting findings and provide 
one potential explanation for this conflict. On the one hand, a number of prior studies suggest 
that investors do not react to herding in analyst forecasts and recommendations. For example, a 
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number of authors warn that investors may be misled by the low dispersion of analyst forecasts 
and recommendations resulting from analyst herding (Cote and Goodstein, 1999; and Glassman, 
2001). Research on investors’ credulity shows that small investors are sometimes unable to 
identify the incentives of more-informed parties in the market such as analysts (e.g., Mikhail, 
Walther, and Willis, 2007). This credulity has been attributed to investors’ overconfidence and 
limited attention (Daniel, Hershleifer, and Teoh, 2002). Further, a number of experimental 
studies show that forecast users (e.g., investors) overestimate the informativeness of expert (e.g., 
analyst) forecasts as the redundancy in these forecasts increases (Maines, 1990; 1996; and Soll, 
1999). Because herding increases the redundancy of analyst forecasts (i.e., the positive 
correlation of individual forecast errors), the previous studies suggest that investors may react 
more strongly to analyst forecasts as herding increases.  
In addition, Olsen (1996) presents archival evidence on factors affecting herding in 
analyst forecasts and examines market reactions to that herding. The author reports a positive 
association between the difficulty of forecasting, measured by historical earnings volatility, and 
both of herding and optimism in analyst forecasts. Further, he reports a negative relation between 
the previous variables and subsequent stock returns. Olsen interprets this finding as evidence that 
the market fails to identify both analyst herding and analyst optimism at the time analyst 
forecasts are issued.  
On the other hand, several recent studies suggest that investors consider analyst herding 
when making judgments and decisions (Bloomfield and Hales, 2009; Cooper, Day, and Lewis, 
2001; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010; Kim and Pantzalis, 2003; and Shroff, Venkataraman, and Xin, 
2005). Kim and Pantzalis (2003) document increased analyst herding when forecasting the 
earnings of diversified firms that are typically difficult to forecast. The authors also document a 
42 
 
negative relation between increased analyst herding for diversified firms and the market 
valuation of the firm. The authors conclude that the market identifies and penalizes diversified 
firms for increased analyst herding. Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) examine market reactions to 
herding in analyst recommendations. They show that stock prices react less strongly to a 
recommendation revision that moves closer to rather than away from the consensus 
recommendation (i.e., one that is more likely to result from herding). The authors conclude that 
the market identifies and accounts for herding in analyst recommendations.  
Moreover, Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) and  Shroff, Venkataraman, and Xin (2005) 
find that the market reacts more strongly to forecasts issued by leader analysts, who issue their 
forecasts first and usually have good forecasting reputations, compared to forecasts issued by 
follower analysts, who issue their confirming forecasts shortly afterwards. As follower analysts 
are likely to be influenced by leader analyst forecasts (i.e., to herd), these results suggest that the 
market may be identifying and reacting to analyst herding.18  
In addition, an experimental study by Bloomfield and Hales (2009) suggests that 
investors are aware of analysts’ tendency to herd their forecasts. In their study, investors are 
provided with individual analyst forecasts and are informed whether or not analysts had the 
chance to observe the consensus forecast before issuing their own forecasts. Further, investors 
develop their own forecasts by combining individual analyst forecasts. When told that analysts 
did not have the chance to observe the consensus, investors combine analyst forecasts by placing 
more weight on forecasts that deviate more from the consensus, as if investors understand that 
these forecasts are based on information not available to the rest of the analysts. In contrast, 
                                                            
18 An alternative explanation for these findings is that the market reacts to the information content of individual 
analyst forecasts (see Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). Compared to leader analyst forecasts, confirming forecasts issued 
by follower analysts convey less new information and are expected to induce weaker market reactions.   
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when told that analysts had the chance to observe the consensus, investors combine analyst 
forecasts by placing similar weights on all forecasts, as if investors understand that analysts have 
already aggregated their information.  
In combination, the prior research findings discussed in this section lead to inconsistent 
conclusions about investors’ reactions to the likelihood of analyst herding. I argue that these 
inconsistencies can be partially reconciled by examining factors that influence investors’ 
estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding and how these estimates impact investors’ 
judgments.19 My study examines two factors inferred from prior research findings: the temporal 
order and preference-consistency of analyst forecasts. I argue that the temporal order of analyst 
forecasts influences investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding and investors’ 
uncertainty judgments. Further, I argue that the preference-consistency of analyst forecasts 
moderates the influence of temporal order on investors’ judgments. These predictions offer one 
explanation for the mixed conclusions about investors’ reactions to the likelihood of analyst 
herding presented by prior studies.  
                                                            
19 There can be several other reasons for the mixed findings documented in that line of research, such as differences 
in research methodologies and samples. In addition, some studies focus on market reactions to herding in analyst 
forecasts (Kim and Pantzalis, 2003; and Olsen, 1996) while other studies focus on market reactions to herding in 
analyst recommendations (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). Jegadeesh and Kim (2010, p. 902 – 904) explain why it may 
be easier, using the archival methodology, to detect analyst herding and market reactions to that herding in the 
context of analyst recommendations rather than analyst forecasts. Further, the two archival studies that examine 
market reactions to herding in analyst forecasts document a negative relation between increased analyst herding and 
the market valuation of the firm (Kim and Pantzalis, 2003; and Olsen, 1996). Nevertheless, Kim and Pantzalis 
conclude that the market identifies and penalizes firms for analyst herding, while Olsen concludes that the market 
fails to identify and react to analyst herding. Neither of the two studies, however, identifies the timing of market 
reactions to herding. I argue that in order to conclude that the market identifies and reacts to herding, differential 
market reactions need to be documented at the time analyst forecasts are issued rather than at the time actual 
earnings are revealed and the accuracy of analyst forecasts is determined.   
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3.2.2 Temporal Order of Analyst Forecasts 
 Analysts tend to issue their forecasts successively with leader analysts, usually possessing 
good forecasting reputation, issuing their forecasts first and follower analysts issuing their 
confirming forecasts shortly afterwards (Cooper, Day, and Lewis, 2001). The market reacts more 
strongly to forecasts issued by leader compared to follower analysts (Cooper, Day, and Lewis, 
2001; and Shroff, Venkataraman, and Xin, 2005).  
 Psychology researchers argue that to establish a causal relation, the cause needs to 
precede the effect in time (Einhorn and Hograth, 1986; and Kelley and Michela, 1980). 
Consistent with this argument, experimental research shows that individuals’ causal inferences 
are strongly influenced by the temporal order of events (Brown, 1985; and Lagnado and Sloman, 
2006). Research on conformity behavior also shows that individuals are aware of the human 
tendency to be influenced by others’ judgments and opinions, especially when faced by a highly 
uncertain judgmental task (Crutchfield, 1955). In an investment context, Bloomfield and Hales’ 
(2009) results suggest that investors expect an analyst’s forecast to be influenced by the 
outstanding consensus forecast.   
The previous studies suggest that when analysts issue their forecasts successively, 
investors will be likely to conclude that follower analysts are influenced by the leader analyst 
forecast (i.e., are herding).20 In contrast, when all analysts issue their forecasts concurrently, 
investors will be unlikely to conclude that analysts are herding. This is because each analyst had 
                                                            
20 Investors may think of alternative potential causes for successive forecast issuance other than analyst herding. For 
example, investors may conclude that analysts issue their forecasts independently but that new information became 
available to some analysts before the others. However, the research cited in this section suggests that investors will 
at least consider analyst herding to be one of the potential causes for successive issuance of analyst forecasts. In 
addition, investors are likely to be aware that the passage of regulation FD made it hard for a certain analyst to 
obtain new information before the rest of the analysts following the same firm. 
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little chance to observe others’ forecasts before issuing his/hers. Prior research also reveals that 
observers are less strongly influenced by agreement between a group of individuals when these 
individuals seem to be influenced by one another rather than to express their independent 
opinions based on the available information (Gerard and Greenbaum, 1962; McGuire, 1969; 
Wilder, 1977; and Wilder, 1978). Therefore, when analysts issue their forecasts successively 
rather than concurrently, investors will be likely to estimate a higher likelihood of analyst 
herding and to discount the low analyst forecast dispersion more strongly. As a result, investors’ 
estimates of uncertainty about future earnings are expected to be influenced by the temporal 
order of analyst forecasts.   
3.2.3 Motivated Skepticism and the Preference-Consistency of Analyst Forecasts 
 Based on prior research findings, I infer that the preference-consistency of analyst 
forecasts is also likely to influence investors’ reactions to perceived analyst herding. A number 
of studies document a positive association between herding and optimism in analyst forecasts 
(Olsen, 1996; and Adut, Sin, and Sinha, 2008), which implies that research on motivated 
reasoning and skepticism (e.g., Ditto and Lopez, 1992; Ditto et al, 1998; Ditto et al; 2003; and 
Kunda, 1990) can help further explain the  mixed investors’ reactions found in prior studies.   
Investors often have directional preferences for the earnings news conveyed by analyst 
forecasts because that earnings news has directional implications for investors’ return on 
investments. When analyst forecasts imply that investors will lose (make) money on their 
investments, analyst forecasts are considered to be inconsistent (consistent) with investors’ 
directional preferences. Based on research on motivated reasoning and skepticism, investors are 
expected to scrutinize preference-inconsistent analyst forecasts in an attempt to discredit these 
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forecasts, and to accept preference-consistent forecasts easily at face value (Ditto and Lopez, 
1992; Ditto et al, 1998; and Hales, 2007). As investors engage in more scrutiny of analyst 
forecasts, they will be more likely to attend to the details related to these forecasts including their 
temporal order.  Therefore, temporal order information will exert a stronger influence on 
investors’ uncertainty judgments when analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent rather than 
preference-consistent.  
 Thus, I predict that when analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent, investors’ 
uncertainty judgments will be strongly influenced by the temporal order of these forecasts. 
Investors will discredit preference-inconsistent analyst forecasts more, and will estimate higher 
uncertainty about future earnings, when these forecasts are issued successively rather than 
concurrently. In contrast, when analyst forecasts are preference-consistent, investors will accept 
these forecasts without much scrutiny. As a result, investors’ uncertainty judgments are less 
likely to be influenced by the temporal order of analyst forecasts.  
 I also predict that investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding will mediate 
the influence of the temporal order of analyst forecasts on investors’ uncertainty judgments. 
When analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent rather than preference-consistent, investors 
will engage in more scrutiny of analyst forecasts in an attempt to discredit these forecasts. As a 
result, the temporal order of analyst forecasts is expected to influence investors’ estimates of the 
likelihood of analyst herding, and these estimates are expected to influence investors’ uncertainty 
judgments, when analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent.  
The previous discussion leads to the following hypotheses.   
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 H1: The effect of the temporal order of analyst forecasts on investors’ judgments of 
uncertainty about future earnings will be greater when analyst forecasts are preference-
inconsistent compared to when analyst forecasts are preference-consistent.     
H2: When analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent, investors’ estimates of the 
likelihood of analyst herding will mediate the influence of the temporal order of analyst 
forecasts on investors’ uncertainty judgments.  
The first hypothesis is illustrated in figure 5.  
3.3 Experimental Design and Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
Ninety-one graduate business students who were registered for graduate accounting 
classes at a large western state university participated in the study. Participants have completed 
an average of 5.65 (2.93) Accounting (Finance) classes. Fifty-nine percent of participants have 
invested in common stock or mutual funds while 98 percent mentioned they plan to invest in 
common stock or mutual funds in the future. Further 32% of participants have completed or were 
registered for a financial statement analysis class at the time of participating in the study. These 
statistics suggest that participants possessed relevant investment-related knowledge and were 
familiar with making investment judgments.21   
                                                            
21 When included as covariates in the analyses, none of participants’ characteristics discussed in this section 
influences the findings reported in the results section.  
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3.3.2 Case Materials and Procedures 
The experiment was administered online. Participants read information that is adapted 
from a real medical technology firm, referred to as American Medical (AmMed) Corporation 
(see appendix 2).22  Similar to Hales (2007) and Thayer (2011), participants were assigned to 
either a short or a long position in AmMed’s stock. The experimental materials explained that 
participants can receive between $5 and $25 and that their payoffs depend on the total number of 
points they receive from three sources: a fixed number of participation points for completing the 
study, accuracy points based on the accuracy of their forecasts of the firm’s EPS, and earnings 
performance points based on how the firm’s actual EPS compare to an arbitrary benchmark of 
$2.27. Participants assigned to a short (long) position in the stock were informed that they will 
receive more earnings performance points as the firm’s actual EPS fall short of (exceed) the 
benchmark.23   
Next, all participants received background information about AmMed and a chart 
illustrating historical EPS numbers for the previous four years. In addition, participants received 
initial forecasts of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5 of $2.24, $2.27, and $2.30, made by three analysts: 
A, B, and C.24, 25  The consensus analyst forecast of $2.27 was equal to the arbitrary benchmark 
                                                            
22 In order to enhance the effectiveness of the preference-consistency manipulation, I select a medical technology 
firm because the technology industry is known to be highly competitive (e.g., Brahm, 1995). This is expected to 
increase participants’ skepticism about whether the firm will be able to maintain the continuous increase in EPS that 
it achieved in prior years.   
23 My preference-consistency manipulation is based on that in Hales (2007) and Thayer (2011). I thank the authors 
for sharing their experimental materials with me.  
24 I provided participants with forecasts made by three analysts consistent with several prior studies that present 
forecasts or opinions from three different experts (e.g., Budescu and Yu, 2006; Budescu and Yu, 2007; and Maines, 
1996). Increasing the number of analysts beyond three works in favor of supporting my hypotheses, because herding 
becomes more obvious as more follower analysts copy the leader analyst forecast.  
25 Analyst forecasts were presented in a tabular form, starting with analyst A’s forecast on top, followed by analyst 
B’s then C’s forecasts. To avoid any unintended consequences of the order of presentation of forecasts, that order 
was counterbalanced between participants. Half of the participants received the forecasts in ascending order, with 
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used to calculate participants’ payoffs. Participants were then asked to provide initial uncertainty 
judgments about future earnings and forecasts of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5.   
Afterwards, all participants read a press article explaining that AmMed expects a decline 
in sales in domestic markets due to increased competition and an increase in sales in 
international markets due to rising demand on higher quality healthcare. Next, participants were 
informed that each analyst revised upward his/her forecast by $0.10, resulting in revised 
forecasts of $2.34, $2.37, and 2.40. After reading the press article and revised analyst forecasts, 
participants are expected to consider the likelihood of analyst herding for a number of reasons. 
First, the analyst forecasts displayed generally low dispersion, consistent with the fact that 
herding reduces forecast dispersion.26 Second, all analysts made equal forecast revisions, 
consistent with prior studies showing that analysts herd by copying the most recent forecast 
revisions (Cooper, Day, and Lewis, 2001) and recommendation revisions (Welch, 2000) made by 
other analysts. Third, as the press article describes opposing factors that impact future earnings 
without implying a specific direction of change in these earnings, participants are likely to assess 
higher uncertainty and to anticipate an increase in analyst forecast dispersion as a result.27 
However, because the forecast revisions were not accompanied by an increase in forecast 
dispersion, contrary to induced expectations, participants will be more likely to consider the 
possibility of analyst herding.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
analyst A making the lowest forecast, and the other half received the forecasts in descending order, with analyst C 
making the lowest forecast.  
26 The coefficient of variation of initial (revised) analyst forecasts is 0.0132 (0.0127). To ensure that these values 
correspond to low levels of analyst forecast dispersion, I collected a sample of one-year-ahead analyst EPS forecasts 
for 2004 – 2009 from the IBES summary file. Observations were selected where the number of analysts following 
the firm is greater than 1 and the mean analyst forecast is positive resulting in a sample of 212,165 observations. 
Analyses reveal that the value 0.0132 (0.0127) belongs to the 19th (18th) percentile of the distribution of the 
coefficient of variation of forecasts in the sample.  
27 The effect of the press article on investors’ uncertainty judgments is analyzed in Section 3.4.1 (Manipulation 
Checks).  
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Since the revised analyst forecasts were higher than the arbitrary benchmark of $2.27, 
these forecasts were preference-inconsistent (preference-consistent) for participants assigned to a 
short (long) position in the firm’s stock. Moreover, in the successive forecasts condition, the 
leader analyst issued his/her revised forecast one day after the press article date, then the other 
two analysts (followers) issued their revised forecasts one day later. The leader analyst is the one 
who made the lowest forecast (analyst A for half of the participants, and analyst C for the rest). 
Participants received the leader analyst forecast first, followed by the follower analyst forecasts 
on the next screen. In the concurrent forecasts condition, all three analysts issued their revised 
forecasts two days after the press article date, and participants received all revised forecasts on 
the same screen. After viewing revised analyst forecasts, all participants were asked to update 
their uncertainty judgments and earnings forecasts. In post-experimental questions, they also 
estimated the likelihood of analyst herding.     
3.3.3 Independent Variables 
 The temporal order of revised analyst forecasts was manipulated at two levels. Half of the 
participants received successive analyst forecasts while the rest received concurrent analyst 
forecasts. The preference-consistency of analyst forecasts was manipulated through participants’ 
investment position. For participants assigned to a short (long) position in the firm’s stock, 
revised analyst forecasts were preference-inconsistent (preference-consistent) because these 
forecasts implied that participants will receive lower (higher) payoffs.  
3.3.4 Dependent Measures 
 Participants estimated uncertainty about the firm’s future earnings by responding to the 
question “How do you rate your level of uncertainty about AmMed’s EPS for 20X5?” on a 7-
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point scale where 1 = ‘Very Low Uncertainty’ and 7 = ‘Very High Uncertainty’. Initial (updated) 
uncertainty judgments were measured after participants received initial (revised) analyst 
forecasts. I test my hypotheses using participants’ updated uncertainty judgments while 
controlling for their initial uncertainty judgments as a covariate.  
 In addition to uncertainty judgments, participants provided their initial and updated 
forecasts of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5. As these forecasts are not the main dependent variable of 
interest, they are analyzed in the additional analysis section.  
3.3.5 Process Measures 
To measure the estimated likelihood of analyst herding, participants were asked the 
following two questions: ‘How likely is it that one or more analysts were influenced by (i.e., 
copied) the revised forecasts issued by the rest of the analysts?’(Q1) and ‘How likely is it that 
each analyst received similar information about the firm’s future earnings, independent of the 
other two analysts and their revised forecasts?’ (Q2). Participants responded to each question on 
a 7-point scale where 1 = ‘Not at All Likely’ and 7 = ‘Very Likely’. Higher (lower) ratings for 
the first (second) question correspond to a higher likelihood of herding.28 I measure the 
estimated likelihood of herding by the average of participants’ responses to the two questions, 
after reverse-coding responses to Q2.    
                                                            
28 The order of presentation of the two questions was counterbalanced between participants. 
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Manipulation Checks 
To assess whether participants attended to the temporal order manipulation, I asked them 
whether analysts revised their forecasts on different days or on the same day. Eighty percent of 
participants correctly identified the temporal order of revised analyst forecasts.29 To assess 
whether participants attended to the preference-consistency manipulation, I asked them whether 
revised analyst forecasts imply that earnings performance points will be added to or deducted 
from each participant’s total points. Eighty-nine percent of participants correctly identified the 
implications of revised analyst forecasts for the earnings performance points they expect to 
receive in the study. 30, 31     
                                                            
29 As explained in the theory section, investors are expected to pay more attention to the details related to analyst 
forecasts, including temporal order, when these forecasts are preference-inconsistent rather than preference-
consistent. Manipulation check responses are directionally consistent with these predictions, where more 
participants passed the temporal order manipulation check in the preference-inconsistent conditions compared to the 
preference-consistent conditions (85% (39/46) vs. 76% (34/45)). However, the difference is not statistically 
significant (Fisher’s Exact Test: p = 0.20, one-tailed). In addition, the overall pass rate of the temporal order 
manipulation check was relatively low (80% (73/91)). One potential reason for this low rate is conducting the study 
online outside the classroom where distractions are common. Another possible reason is that unlike the preference-
consistency manipulation, the temporal order manipulation was not made salient at the beginning of the 
experimental task.  
30 Results of tests of hypotheses reported in this section are inferentially identical if the analysis is performed only 
on participants who pass the two manipulation checks. Further, all results are inferentially identical when controlling 
for the order of presentation of analyst forecasts and the order of presentation of the two questions used to measure 
the estimated likelihood of analyst herding.    
31 To evaluate the impact of the press article on investors’ uncertainty judgments, 16 additional graduate business 
students (who did not otherwise participate in the research studies reported in this dissertation) were provided with 
the background information about the firm, initial analyst forecasts, and the press article. Afterwards, participants 
rated the overall tone of the article on a 7-point scale where 1 = ‘Negative”, 4 = ‘Neutral’, and 7 = ‘Positive’. 
Participants’ ratings were not significantly different from 4 which suggests they considered the tone of the article to 
be neutral (i.e., they did not identify a specific direction of change in future earnings from the article) (mean = 3.63, 
t = -0.97, p = 0.35, two-tailed). In addition, participants rated the change in their level of uncertainty about future 
earnings as a result of reading the article on a 7-point scale where 1 = ‘Decreased’, 4 = ‘Not Changed’ and 7 = 
‘Increased’. Participants’ ratings were significantly higher than 4 which suggests they experienced an increase in 
uncertainty as a result of reading the press article (mean = 5.19, t = 2.64, p = 0.02, two-tailed).  
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3.4.2 Tests of Hypotheses 
3.4.2.1 Test of H1  
H1 predicts that the influence of temporal order of analyst forecasts (i.e., the increase in 
investors’ estimates of uncertainty when analyst forecasts are issued successively rather than 
concurrently) will be greater when analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent rather than 
preference-consistent. Panel A of table 4 presents means (standard errors) of participants’ initial 
uncertainty judgments, updated uncertainty judgments, and updated uncertainty judgments 
adjusted for the effect of initial uncertainty judgments. Figure 6 illustrates the adjusted least 
square means of participants’ updated uncertainty judgments. I test H1 using participants’ 
updated uncertainty judgments while controlling for their initial uncertainty judgments as a 
covariate.32 Since H1 predicts an ordinal interaction between the preference-consistency and 
temporal order of analyst forecasts, contrast coding is the most appropriate way to test H1. Using 
contrast codes enhances statistical power compared to the interaction tested in conventional 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) without increasing the associated Type I error rates (Buckless 
and Ravenscroft, 1990).33 
Consistent with my predictions, I test H1 using the following set of contrast weights:  +3, 
+1, -2, -2 for preference-inconsistent/successive, preference-inconsistent/concurrent, preference-
consistent/successive, and preference-consistent/concurrent respectively. The ordinal interaction 
                                                            
32 Results of testing H1 are inferentially identical if I use a repeated-measures ANOVA for participants’ initial and 
updated uncertainty judgments. In addition, untabulated analyses reveal that investors’ initial uncertainty judgments 
do not differ significantly across conditions.  
33 Untabulated ANCOVA of participants’ updated uncertainty judgments reveals a significant main effect of the 
preference-consistency of analyst forecasts (F = 6.70, p = 0.01, two-tailed), an insignificant main effect of the 
temporal order of analyst forecasts (F = 2.18; p = 0.14, two-tailed), and an insignificant preference-consistency * 
temporal order interaction (F = 1.60, p = 0.21, two-tailed). Also, the main effect of participants’ initial uncertainty 
judgments was significant (F = 9.45, p <0.01, two-tailed).  
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tested by such a contrast consists of mainly two simple effects: the simple effect of preference-
consistency given successive forecasts and the simple effect of temporal order given preference-
inconsistent forecasts (Dawes, 1988, p. 212-214). Further, my planned contrast implies that the 
simple effect of temporal order given preference-consistent forecasts will be insignificant (cf., 
Buckless and Ravenscroft, 1990, p. 940-942). For completeness, I also examine whether the 
simple effect of preference-consistency given concurrent forecasts is significant (see Elliott, 
Krische, and Peecher, 2010).   
Panel B of table 4 reports that the +3, +1, -2, -2 contrast is significant (F = 9.55, p <0.01, 
one-tailed). Panel B also shows that for successive forecasts, participants estimated higher 
uncertainty when analyst forecasts were preference-inconsistent rather than preference-consistent 
(F = 7.58, p = <0.01, one-tailed). In addition, for preference-inconsistent forecasts, participants 
estimated higher uncertainty when analysts issued their forecasts successively rather than 
concurrently (F = 3.81, p = 0.03, one-tailed). Further, results show that for preference-consistent 
forecasts, participants’ estimates of uncertainty did not differ significantly when analysts issued 
their forecasts successively rather than concurrently (F = 0.02, p = 0.88, two-tailed). For 
completeness, I report that for concurrent forecasts, participants’ estimates of uncertainty were 
directionally higher when analyst forecasts were preference-inconsistent compared to preference-
consistent; however, the difference was not statistically significant (F = 0.87, p = 0.18, one-
tailed). Overall, these results support the ordinal interaction between the preference-consistency 
and temporal order of analyst forecasts predicted in H1.34 
                                                            
34 I verify that results of testing H1 are robust to alternative sets of contrast weights such as: +3, -1, -1, -1 for 
preference-inconsistent/successive, preference-inconsistent/concurrent, preference-consistent/successive, and 
preference-consistent/concurrent respectively (F = 9.60, p <0.01, one-tailed). This set of contrast weights is more 
restrictive than my original set of contrast weights as it does not allow for a significant simple effect of preference-
consistency given concurrent forecasts.   
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3.4.2.2 Test of H2 
 H1 predicts that the effect of the temporal order of analyst forecasts on investors’ 
uncertainty judgments will be greater when analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent rather 
than preference-consistent. In-line with this prediction, H2 predicts that investors’ estimates of 
the likelihood of analyst herding will mediate the influence of temporal order on investors’ 
uncertainty judgments when analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent. Participants estimated 
the likelihood of analyst herding by responding to two questions, Q1 and Q2, as explained 
before. I calculate the average of participants’ responses to the two questions after reverse-
coding responses to Q2. The resulting average, labeled the estimated likelihood of analyst 
herding, is used to test H2.35 Panel A of table 5 presents means (standard errors) of the estimated 
likelihood of analyst herding and participants’ responses to Q1 and Q2.  
I test H2 using the 46 participants in the preference-inconsistent forecasts conditions 
only. Based on Baron and Kenny (1986), the following conditions must hold to establish the 
predicted mediation relation. First, the main effect of temporal order must be significant for the 
estimated likelihood of analyst herding. Second, the main effect of temporal order must be 
significant for investors’ updated uncertainty judgments. Third, when all variables are included 
in the model, the explanatory power of the estimated likelihood of analyst herding for investors’ 
updated uncertainty judgments must retain significance and the explanatory power of temporal 
order for investors’ updated uncertainty judgments must be reduced.36  
                                                            
35 Results of testing H2 are inferentially identical when performing factor analysis on participants’ responses to the 
two questions and using the resulting factor as a mediator in the analysis.     
36 When testing the second and third mediation conditions, I include investors’ initial uncertainty judgments as a 
covariate in the analysis.   
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 Panel B of table 5 presents results of an ANOVA for testing the first mediation condition. 
Results reveal that the main effect of temporal order is significant for the estimated likelihood of 
analyst herding (F = 3.46, p = 0.07, two-tailed). Panel C of table 5 presents results of an 
ANCOVA for testing the second mediation condition. Results show that the main effect of 
temporal order is significant for investors’ updated uncertainty judgments (F = 4.02, p = 0.05, 
two-tailed). Finally, panel D of table 5 presents results of an ANCOVA for testing the third 
mediation condition. The results reveal that when all variables are included in the model, the 
estimated likelihood of analyst herding continues to influence investors’ updated uncertainty 
judgments (F = 3.59, p = 0.07, two-tailed). Further, the main effect of temporal order is no longer 
significant for investors’ updated uncertainty judgments (F = 2.11, p = 0.15, two-tailed). Overall, 
these results support the mediating role of the estimated likelihood of herding predicted in H2.37 
3.4.3 Additional Analyses 
3.4.3.1 Analyzing the Dispersion of Investors’ Forecasts  
 H1 predicts that the effect of the temporal order of analyst forecasts on investors’ 
estimates of uncertainty about future earnings will be greater when analyst forecasts are 
preference-inconsistent rather than when analyst forecasts are preference-consistent. Results 
show that this hypothesis is supported using investors’ updated uncertainty judgments as the 
dependent measure. In this section, I present an alternative test of H1 using the dispersion of 
investors’ updated earnings forecasts as the dependent measure.  
                                                            
37 Untabulated analyses reveal that the mediation relation predicted in H2 does not hold when analyst forecasts are 
preference-consistent. The main effect of temporal order is insignificant for the estimated likelihood of analyst 
herding (F = 0.07, p = 0.79, two-tailed) and investors’ updated uncertainty judgments (F = 0.04, p = 0.85, two-
tailed), which means that the first and second conditions for mediation are not satisfied when analyst forecasts are 
preference-consistent.   
57 
 
 Panel A of table 6 reports means (standard errors) of participants’ initial forecasts, 
updated forecasts, and updated forecasts adjusted for the effect of initial forecasts.38 As expected, 
untabulated analyses show that the assumption of homogeneity of variance is rejected for 
participants’ updated forecasts using the Levene’s test (F = 3.61, p = 0.02, two-tailed). Similar to 
Hales (2007) and Elliott and White (2011), I measure the dispersion of investors’ forecasts by the 
absolute deviations of participants’ forecasts from their mean in each experimental condition. 
Panel B of table 6 reports means (standard errors) of absolute deviations calculated for: 
participants’ initial forecasts, updated forecasts, and updated forecasts adjusted for the effect 
absolute deviations of initial forecasts. Figure 7 illustrates the adjusted least square means of 
absolute deviations of participants’ updated forecasts.  
Untabulated analyses reveal that the assumption of homogeneity of variance is violated 
for the absolute deviations of participants’ updated earnings forecasts (F = 5.04, p <0.01, two-
tailed). Therefore, I report non-parametric analyses of ranked absolute deviations of investors’ 
forecasts. Panel C of table 6 presents means (standard errors) of ranked absolute deviations 
calculated for: participants’ initial forecasts, updated forecasts, and updated forecasts adjusted 
for the effect of ranked absolute deviations of initial forecasts. I test H1 using ranked absolute 
deviations of participants’ updated forecasts as the dependent measure while controlling for the 
ranked absolute deviations of their initial forecasts as a covariate. I then test H1 using the same 
set of contrast weights that I used before: +3, +1, -2, -2 for preference-inconsistent/successive, 
                                                            
38 Untabulated analyses show that participants’ initial and updated forecasts do not differ significantly between 
experimental conditions. ANOVAs of participants’ forecasts reveal that the main effects of preference-consistency 
and temporal order, as well as the preference consistency * temporal order interactions are all insignificant (for 
initial forecasts: all F ≤ 1.36, all p ≥ 0.25, two-tailed; for updated forecasts adjusted for the effect of initial forecasts: 
all F ≤ 1.42, all p > 0.24, two-tailed). Results are inferentially identical if non-parametric analyses are performed on 
ranked participants’ forecasts. 
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preference-inconsistent/concurrent, preference-consistent/successive, and preference-
consistent/concurrent respectively.  
 Results reported in Panel D of table 6 reveal that the +3, +1, -2, -2 contrast is significant 
(F = 3.52, p = 0.03, one-tailed), consistent with my predictions. For completeness, I report results 
of follow-up simple effect tests. For successive analyst forecasts, the dispersion of investors’ 
forecasts was directionally higher when analyst forecasts were preference-inconsistent compared 
to preference-consistent; however, the difference was not statistically significant (F = 1.16, p = 
0.14, one-tailed). Further, for preference-inconsistent analyst forecasts, the dispersion of 
investors’ forecasts was directionally higher when analyst forecasts were issued successively 
rather than concurrently; however, the difference was not statistically significant as well (F = 
0.79, p = 0.19, one-tailed). These results reveal that the two simple effects that compose the +3, 
+1, -2, -2 contrast are directionally consistent with my expectations, albeit not being significant 
at conventional levels.  
  Moreover, for preference-consistent analyst forecasts, the dispersion of investors’ 
forecasts did not differ significantly when analyst forecasts were issued successively rather than 
concurrently (F = 1.21, p = 0.27, two-tailed). Finally, for concurrent analyst forecasts, the 
dispersion of investors’ forecasts was directionally higher when analyst forecasts were 
preference-inconsistent rather than preference-consistent; however the difference was not 
statistically significant (F = 1.63, p = 0.10, one-tailed). Overall, these results provide some 
support for the ordinal preference-consistency * temporal order interaction predicted by H1.39   
                                                            
39 Untabulated parametric tests performed on absolute deviations of participants’ forecasts provide stronger support 
for H1. These tests show that the +3, +1, -2, -2 contrast is significant (F = 6.23, p = 0.01, one-tailed). Further, for 
successive analyst forecasts, investors’ forecasts were more dispersed when analyst forecasts were preference-
inconsistent as opposed to preference-consistent (F = 3.38, p = 0.03, one-tailed). In addition, for preference-
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3.4.3.2 The Effect of Investors’ Loss Aversion 
Loss aversion refers to the finding that losses loom larger than gains (i.e., individuals are 
more inclined to avoid losses than to achieve gains) (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). If, 
participants’ loss aversion differs significantly across experimental conditions, this may 
influence participants’ uncertainty judgments and confound the effect of the preference-
consistency manipulation. Although I do not measure participants’ loss aversion, prior research 
documents that loss aversion is associated with individuals’ age, gender, and level of education 
(Brooks and Zank, 2005; Hjorth and Fosgerau, 2009; and Johnson, Gächter, and Herrmann, 
2006). Untabulated analyses suggest that participants’ age and gender do not differ significantly 
across experimental conditions (all p ≥ 0.45, two-tailed). In addition, participants had a similar 
level of education being recruited as students. Therefore, participants’ loss aversion is unlikely to 
differ significantly across experimental conditions or to confound the effect of the preference-
consistency manipulation in this study.  
3.5 Conclusion 
My second study investigates circumstances under which investors’ judgments of 
uncertainty about future earnings are influenced by their estimates of the likelihood of analyst 
herding. I predict and show that the preference-consistency of analyst forecasts moderates the 
influence of the temporal order of these forecasts on investors’ uncertainty judgments. Further, 
when analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent, investors’ estimates of the likelihood of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
inconsistent analyst forecasts, investors’ forecasts were more dispersed when analyst forecasts were issued 
successively rather than concurrently (F = 3.16, p = 0.04, one-tailed). For completeness, I also report that for 
preference-consistent analyst forecasts, the dispersion of investors’ forecasts did not differ significantly when 
analyst forecasts were issued successively rather than concurrently (F = 0.93, p = 0.34, two-tailed). Finally, for 
concurrent analyst forecasts, the dispersion of investors’ forecasts did not differ significantly when analyst forecasts 
were preference-inconsistent rather than preference-consistent (F = 1.04, p = 0.16, one-tailed). These results support 
the ordinal preference-consistency * temporal order interaction predicted by H1.  
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analyst herding mediate the influence of temporal order on investors’ uncertainty judgments. 
Additional analyses provide some evidence that the preference-consistency of analyst forecasts 
moderates the influence of temporal order on the dispersion of investors’ forecasts.  
 This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, I do not measure investors’ loss 
aversion. While additional analyses suggest that loss aversion is not likely to confound the effect 
of the preference-consistency manipulation, I cannot completely rule out that possibility. Future 
research that manipulates the preference-consistency of information can measure participants’ 
loss aversion to control for its potential impact on their judgments.  
 Second, my study focuses on a case of good news analyst forecasts, where analysts revise 
their forecasts upwards. I made this design choice because prior research suggests that analysts’ 
incentives and biases lead them to herd more strongly on good news rather than bad news (Adut, 
Sen, and Sinha, 2008; and Olsen, 1996). Future research can examine whether my study’s results 
extend to a case of bad news forecasts, where analysts revise their forecasts downwards. To the 
extent that bad news forecasts are more credible than good news forecasts (e.g., Hutton, Miller, 
and Skinner, 2003), the effect of the preference-consistency of analyst forecasts on investors’ 
judgments may be reduced. However, Hales (2007) shows that the preference-consistency of 
analyst forecasts influences investors’ judgments whether the consensus analyst forecast is 
higher than the benchmark used to calculate investors’ payoffs (a case that is comparable to good 
news forecasts) or lower than the benchmark (a case that is comparable to bad news forecasts). 
Therefore, I expect my study’s findings to generalize to a case of bad news analyst forecasts.  
 Third, my study examines the influence of investors’ estimates of the likelihood of 
analyst herding on one type of investment judgments, which is estimating uncertainty about 
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future earnings. Although my first study shows that investors’ perceptions of uncertainty 
influence their willingness to invest, future research may continue to explore the influence of 
investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding on other investment judgments, such as 
estimating cost of capital, and other investment decisions.  
 Despite these limitations, my second study provides a potential explanation for the mixed 
findings related to investors’ reactions to the likelihood of analyst herding documented in prior 
research. Results show that the preference-consistency of analyst forecasts moderates these 
reactions. In addition, my study extends research on investors’ credulity. My theory and findings 
suggest that motivated reasoning can be another mechanism, in addition to limited attention and 
overconfidence, that contributes to investors’ inability to identify the incentives of more-
informed market participants.   
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3.6 Figures 
FIGURE 5 
Study 2: Predictions - Investors’ Uncertainty Judgments  
 
Figure 5 displays the predicted effects of the preference-consistency and temporal order of analyst forecasts on 
investors’ judgments of uncertainty about future earnings (H1). H1 predicts an ordinal interaction that can be tested 
using contrast weights such as +3, +1, -2, -2 for preference-inconsistent/successive, preference-
inconsistent/concurrent, preference-consistent/successive, and preference-consistent/concurrent, respectively. This 
interaction consists mainly of two simple effects: the simple effect of preference-consistency given successive 
forecasts and the simple effect of temporal order given preference-inconsistent forecasts.   
 
Preference-Inconsistent Preference-Consistent
Successive Forecasts
Concurrent Forecasts
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FIGURE 6 
Study 2: Results for H1 – Investors’ Uncertainty Judgments 
 
Figure 6 displays the observed pattern of adjusted least square means of participants’ updated uncertainty judgments 
(see panel A of table 4). This pattern is tested using the planned contrasts presented in panel B of table 4. See table 4 
for a discussion of participants’ initial and updated uncertainty judgments. 
 
4.79 
3.58 
3.93 
3.51 
Preference-Inconsistent Preference-Consistent
Successive Forecasts
Concurrent Forecasts
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FIGURE 7 
Study 2: Results for H1 – Dispersion of Investors’ Forecasts 
 
Figure 7 displays the observed pattern of adjusted least square means of absolute deviations of participants’ updated 
earnings forecasts from experimental condition mean forecasts (see panel B of table 6). This pattern is tested using 
the planned contrasts presented in panel D of table 6. See table 6 for a discussion of participants’ initial and updated 
earnings forecasts. 
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3.7 Tables 
TABLE 4 
Study 2: Test of H1 – Investors’ Uncertainty Judgments  
Panel A: Means [Standard Errors] of Investors’ Initial Uncertainty Judgments, Updated 
Uncertainty Judgments, and Updated Uncertainty Judgments Adjusted for Initial 
Uncertainty Judgments   
Preference 
Consistency 
Temporal 
Order  n 
Initial 
Uncertainty 
Updated 
Uncertainty 
Updated 
Uncertainty- 
Adjusted 
Inconsistent Successive 23 
3.78 
[0.27] 
4.83 
[0.33] 
4.79 
[0.31] 
Inconsistent Concurrent 23 
3.87 
[0.27] 
4.00 
[0.33] 
3.93 
[0.31] 
Consistent Successive 23 
3.65 
[0.27] 
3.57 
[0.33] 
3.58 
[0.31] 
Consistent Concurrent 22 
3.41 
[0.28] 
3.41 
[0.33] 
3.51 
[0.32] 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Panel B: Planned Contrast Coding for H1 and Follow-up Simple Effect Tests Using 
Investors’ Updated Uncertainty Judgments as the Dependent Variable and Their Initial 
Uncertainty Judgments as a Covariate 
Source df F-ratio p-value 
Overall Test [H1]: 
 
The effect of the temporal order of analyst forecasts on 
investors’ estimates of uncertainty about future earnings 
will be greater when analyst forecasts are preference-
inconsistent compared to when analyst forecasts are 
preference-consistent.   
 
Contrast weights [3, 1, -2, -2] 
1 9.55 <0.01* 
Follow-up Simple Effect Tests    
Effect of preference-consistency given successive forecasts  1 7.58 <0.01* 
Effect of temporal order given preference-inconsistent 
forecasts  
1 3.81 0.03* 
Effect of temporal order given preference-consistent 
forecasts 
1 0.02 0.88** 
Effect of preference-consistency given concurrent forecasts 1 0.87 0.18* 
 
Participants received initial analyst forecasts of the firm’s EPS for 20X5 with the consensus analyst forecast equal to 
the benchmark of $2.27 used to calculate participants’ payoffs. Next, participants provided initial uncertainty 
judgments by responding to the following question “How do you rate your level of uncertainty about AmMed’s EPS 
for 20X5?” on a 7-point scale where 1= “Very Low Uncertainty” and 7= “Very High Uncertainty”. Afterwards, 
participants received revised analyst forecasts with the consensus forecast equal to $2.37. Depending on participants’ 
investment position, the revised analyst forecasts were either inconsistent or consistent with participants’ preferences. 
Further, analysts revised their forecasts on two consecutive days (where the leader revised his/her forecast first 
followed by follower analysts on the next day) or on the same day. Next, participants provided their updated 
uncertainty judgments.  
 
I test H1 using participants’ updated uncertainty judgments as the dependent variable and their initial uncertainty 
judgments as a covariate.   
 
* One-tailed p-values given my directional hypotheses.  
** Two-tailed p-values.  
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TABLE 5 
Study 2: Test of H2 
Panel A: Means [Standard Errors] of the Estimated Likelihood of Analyst Herding   
Preference 
Consistency 
Temporal 
Order  n  
Estimated 
Likelihood of 
Herding  Q1 Q2 
Inconsistent Successive 23 
4.57 
[0.26] 
5.00 
[0.33] 
3.87 
[0.35] 
Inconsistent Concurrent 23 
3.85 
[0.26] 
4.52 
[0.33] 
4.83 
[0.35] 
Consistent Successive 23 
3.33 
[0.26] 
3.43 
[0.33] 
4.78 
[0.35] 
Consistent Concurrent 22 
3.23 
[0.27] 
3.09 
[0.34] 
4.64 
[0.36] 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Model of the Estimated Likelihood of Analyst Herding  
Source df 
Mean-
Square F-ratio p-value* 
Temporal Order 1 5.92 3.46 0.07 
Error 44 1.71   
Corrected Total 45    
 
Panel C: ANCOVA Model of Investors’ Updated Uncertainty Judgments Using Their Initial 
Uncertainty Judgments as a Covariate 
Source df 
Mean-
Square F-ratio p-value* 
Temporal Order 1 8.68 4.02 0.05 
Initial Uncertainty  1 16.50 7.65 0.01 
Error 43 2.16   
Corrected Total 45    
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 TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Panel D: ANCOVA Model of Investors’ Updated Uncertainty Judgments Using the 
Estimated Likelihood of Analyst Herding as an Independent Variable and Investors’ Initial 
Uncertainty Judgments as a Covariate  
Source df 
Mean-
Square F-ratio p-value* 
Temporal Order  1 4.30 2.11 0.15 
Initial Uncertainty  1 12.44 6.11 0.02 
Estimated Likelihood of Herding 1 7.30 3.59 0.07 
Error 42 2.04   
Corrected Total 45    
    
See table 4 for a description of the preference-consistency and temporal order manipulations, as well as investors’ 
initial and updated uncertainty judgments.  
 
After investors provided their updated uncertainty judgments, they estimated the likelihood of analyst herding by 
responding to the following two questions: ‘How likely is it that one or more analysts were influenced by (i.e., copied) 
the revised forecasts issued by the rest of the analysts?’ (Q1) and ‘How likely is it that each analyst received similar 
information about the firm’s future earnings, independent of the other two analysts and their revised forecasts?’ (Q2). 
Participants responded to each question on a 7-point scale where 1 = ‘Not at All Likely’ and 7 = ‘Very Likely’. I 
measure the estimated likelihood of analyst herding by averaging participants’ responses to the two questions after 
reverse-coding responses to Q2 and use the resulting average to test H2.    
   
 
I test H2 using the responses of participants in the preference-inconsistent forecasts conditions only.  
 
* Two-tailed p-values.  
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TABLE 6 
Study 2: Test of H1 - Dispersion of Investors’ Forecasts 
Panel A: Means [Standard Errors] of Investors’ Initial Forecasts, Updated Forecasts, and 
Updated Forecasts Adjusted for the Effect of Initial Forecasts. Results are reported in cents.   
Preference 
Consistency 
Temporal 
Order  n 
Initial 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
Updated 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
Updated 
Earnings 
Forecasts- 
Adjusted 
Inconsistent Successive 23 
226.43 
[1.47] 
234.83 
[1.57] 
235.58 
[1.28] 
Inconsistent Concurrent 23 
227.13 
[1.47] 
236.96 
[1.57] 
237.27 
[1.27] 
Consistent Successive 23 
228.96 
[1.47] 
237.30 
[1.57] 
236.48 
[1.28] 
Consistent Concurrent 22 
228.05 
[1.50] 
238.09 
[1.60] 
237.83 
[1.30] 
 
Panel B: Means [Standard Errors] of Absolute Deviations of Investors’ Forecasts from 
Experimental Condition Mean Forecasts, Calculated for: Initial Forecasts, Updated 
Forecasts, and Updated Forecasts Adjusted for the Effect of Absolute Deviations of Initial 
Forecasts  
Preference 
Consistency 
Temporal 
Order  n 
Initial 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
Updated 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
Updated 
Earnings 
Forecasts- 
Adjusted 
Inconsistent Successive 23 
4.95 
[1.01] 
7.59 
[1.00] 
7.60 
[0.94] 
Inconsistent Concurrent 23 
5.53 
[1.01] 
5.43 
[1.00] 
5.25 
[0.94] 
Consistent Successive 23 
4.90 
[1.01] 
5.13 
[1.00] 
5.17 
[0.94] 
Consistent Concurrent 22 
4.60 
[1.03] 
3.74 
[1.02] 
3.88 
[0.96] 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
Panel C: Means [Standard Errors] of Ranked Absolute Deviations of Investors’ Forecasts 
from Experimental Condition Mean Forecasts, Calculated for: Initial Forecasts, Updated 
Forecasts, and Updated Forecasts Adjusted for the Effect of Ranked Absolute Deviations of 
Initial Forecasts  
Preference 
Consistency 
Temporal 
Order  n 
Initial 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
Updated 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
Updated 
Earnings 
Forecasts- 
Adjusted 
Inconsistent Successive 23 
42.17 
[5.53] 
52.83 
[5.45] 
53.75 
[5.33] 
Inconsistent Concurrent 23 
51.35 
[5.53] 
48.30 
[5.45] 
47.01 
[5.34] 
Consistent Successive 23 
48.26 
[5.53] 
46.17 
[5.45] 
45.63 
[5.32] 
Consistent Concurrent 22 
42.04 
[5.66] 
36.27 
[5.57] 
37.23 
[5.45] 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
Panel D: Planned Contrast Coding and Follow-up Simple Effect Tests Using Ranked 
Absolute Deviations of Investors’ Updated Forecasts as the Dependent Variable and Ranked 
Absolute Deviations of Their Initial Forecasts as a Covariate 
Source df F-ratio p-value 
Overall Test [H1]: 
 
The effect of the temporal order of analyst forecasts on the 
dispersion of investors’ forecasts will be greater when 
analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent compared to 
when analyst forecasts are preference-consistent.   
 
Contrast weights [3, 1, -2, -2] 
1 3.52 0.03* 
Follow-up Simple Effect Tests    
Effect of preference-consistency given successive forecasts  1 1.16 0.14* 
Effect of temporal order given preference-inconsistent 
forecasts  
1 0.79 0.19* 
Effect of temporal order given preference-consistent 
forecasts 
1 1.21 0.27** 
Effect of preference-consistency given concurrent forecasts 1 1.63 0.10* 
 
See table 4 for a description of the preference-consistency and temporal order manipulations.  
 
Participants provided their initial (updated) forecasts of the firm’s EPS for 20X5 after viewing initial (revised) analyst 
forecasts.  
 
To test H1 using the dispersion of investors’ forecasts, I calculate the ranked absolute deviations of individual 
participants’ forecasts from experimental condition mean forecasts. I use ranked absolute deviations of participants’ 
updated forecasts as the dependent variable while controlling for ranked absolute deviations of their initial forecasts as 
a covariate.  
 
* One-tailed p-values given my directional hypotheses.  
** Two-tailed p-values. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 In this dissertation, I investigate conditions under which investors’ judgments of 
uncertainty about future earnings are influenced by their perceptions about the likelihood of 
analyst herding. My first study manipulates analyst forecast dispersion and earnings volatility to 
examine whether investors react as if they consider the likelihood of analyst herding when 
making uncertainty judgments based on these manipulated factors. Results show that when 
analyst forecast dispersion is high, earnings volatility influences investors’ willingness to invest 
and that influence is mediated by investors’ uncertainty judgments. However, when analyst 
forecast dispersion is low, earnings volatility does not influence investors’ willingness to invest 
or uncertainty judgments. These findings suggest that when relying on analyst forecast 
dispersion and earnings volatility to make uncertainty judgments, investors react as if they do not 
consider the likelihood of analyst herding.   
My second study focuses on a case of low analyst forecast dispersion and manipulates the 
preference-consistency and temporal order of analyst forecasts, because examining the joint 
influence of these two factors on investors’ uncertainty judgments can help reconcile the mixed 
findings about investors’ reactions to the likelihood of analyst herding documented in prior 
research. Results show that when analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent, temporal order 
influences investors’ uncertainty judgments and that influence is mediated by investors’ 
estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding. In contrast, when analyst forecasts are preference-
consistent, temporal order does not influence investors’ uncertainty judgments or their estimates 
of the likelihood of analyst herding.  
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 In chapters 2 and 3, I discuss a number of limitations of each study and provide 
suggestions for future research to address these limitations. In this chapter, I discuss additional 
implications of my two studies’ results and highlight some research questions that remain 
unanswered.  
 Taken together, my two studies extend research on investors’ reactions to the 
characteristics of analyst forecasts. Prior research examines investors’ reactions to several 
characteristics of analyst forecasts such as the accuracy (e.g., Kadous, Mercer, and Thayer, 
2009), boldness (e.g., Clement and Tse, 2005; and Kadous, Mercer, and Thayer, 2009), 
preference-consistency (e.g., Hales, 2007; and Thayer, 2011), temporal order (e.g., Cooper, Day, 
and Lewis, 2001; and Shroff, Venkataraman, and Xin, 2005), and dispersion (e.g., Barron and 
Stuerke, 1998) of these forecasts. My two studies examine reactions to analyst forecast 
dispersion and how these reactions are affected by investors’ perceptions about the reasons 
behind the level of forecast dispersion.  Results suggest that while investors are likely to pay less 
attention to other measures of uncertainty when forecast dispersion is low rather than high, they 
discount cases of low dispersion when they perceive potential analyst herding to be a possible 
cause for that low dispersion.  
However, results of my two studies provide support for warnings that investors may not 
always recognize potential analyst herding (e.g., Cote and Goodstein, 1999; and Glassman, 
2001). My first study suggests that investors may arrive to non-herding explanations of the 
inconsistency between low analyst forecast dispersion and high earnings volatility. My second 
study shows that investors do not consider the likelihood of analyst herding when analyst 
forecasts are preference-consistent. These findings can be informative for investors’ education 
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programs that may motivate investors to consider the likelihood of analyst herding when making 
investment judgments and decisions.40  
Future research may investigate other factors that influence investors’ estimates of the 
likelihood of analyst herding. One potential factor is investors’ sophistication which may impact 
their alertness to analysts’ tendency to herd their forecasts. Compared to less-sophisticated 
investors, more-sophisticated investors may be more likely to consider the likelihood of analyst 
herding when a) analyst forecast dispersion is low and earnings volatility is high (Study 1), and 
b) analyst forecasts are preference-consistent (Study 2). Therefore, investors’ sophistication may 
be an additional factor that helps reconcile the mixed findings documented in prior research 
about investors’ reactions to the likelihood of analyst herding.  
Future research can also examine how analyst experience may affect investors’ estimates 
of the likelihood of analyst herding. Prior research presents mixed findings about the relation 
between analyst experience and the tendency to herd. Some studies suggest a negative relation 
between analyst experience and herding (e.g., Clement and Tse, 2005; and Hong, Kubik, and 
Solomon, 2000) while other studies suggest a positive relation (e.g., Zitzewitz, 2001). Given 
these mixed findings, it may be interesting to examine how analyst experience, or more 
specifically the difference in experience between leader and follower analysts, influences 
investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding. 
In addition to perceptions about potential analyst herding, investors’ reactions to analyst 
forecast dispersion are likely to be influenced by other types of perceptions. Specifically, since 
                                                            
40 For examples of investor education programs see the SEC’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy website 
(http://www.sec.gov/investor.shtml) and the FINRA Investor Education Foundation website 
(http://www.finrafoundation.org/about/index.htm). 
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forecast dispersion results from the decisions made by individual analysts when determining the 
levels and timing of issuing their forecasts, investors’ perceptions about the analysts, their 
characteristics and motivations, and the firm followed may all influence investors’ reactions to 
analyst forecast dispersion.  Future research can investigate other types of perceptions that may 
influence investors’ reactions to analyst forecast dispersion as a measure of uncertainty. For 
example, investors’ perceptions about the availability of information about the firm to analysts 
may affect the degree to which investors rely on analyst forecasts to make judgments and 
decisions, including their reliance on forecast dispersion to make uncertainty judgments. 
In addition to investors’ reactions to analyst forecast dispersion, my second study has 
implications for research on investors’ reactions to the temporal order, boldness, and preference-
consistency of analyst forecasts. First, my study investigates investors’ reactions to temporal 
order when analysts agree on forecasted earnings (i.e., when forecast dispersion is low). Future 
research can investigate how temporal order influences investors’ reactions to bold analyst 
forecasts that deviate from the consensus forecast. While prior research shows that bold analyst 
forecasts elicit strong reactions from investors (e.g., Clement and Tse, 2005; and Kadous, 
Mercer, and Thayer, 2009), I expect these reactions to be stronger when bold forecasts are issued 
after rather than before the rest of analyst forecasts. This is because issuing a bold forecast after 
observing other analyst forecasts implies that the bold analyst is confident in his/her own 
forecast, with prior research showing that the message sender’s confidence has a positive impact 
on the believability of his/her message (e.g., Lee, 2005).  
Second, my second study also highlights additional effects of the preference-consistency 
of analyst forecasts on investors’ reactions to the information obtained from analysts. Prior 
research shows that the preference-consistency of analyst forecasts affects investors’ reactions to 
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the levels of these forecasts (Hales, 2007) and investors’ choice of the individual analyst research 
reports that they acquire (Thayer, 2011). My study extends that research by illustrating that the 
preference-consistency of analyst forecasts influences investors’ reactions to the temporal order 
of these forecasts. Future research may investigate additional influences of the preference-
consistency of analyst forecasts on investors’ reactions to the information obtained from 
analysts. 
Other than research on investors’ reactions to characteristics of analyst forecasts, my first 
study has implications for research on the determinants of investors’ uncertainty judgments. 
Results of that study suggest that when investors have access to analyst forecasts and historical 
earnings information, they are inclined to estimate uncertainty about future earnings based on 
forecast dispersion rather than earnings volatility. Future research may directly investigate 
whether investors prefer to rely on certain measures of uncertainty more than others when 
making investment judgments and decisions. The findings of that research can be informative for 
standard setters, investment newsletters, security analysts, and firm managers who may wish to 
emphasize measures of uncertainty that investors are inclined to use. In addition, the findings 
may be helpful in better understanding the observed variations in stock returns. Moreover, if 
investors display preferences for certain measures of uncertainty, future studies may investigate 
whether these preferences will influence investors’ information search and acquisition when 
information about measures of uncertainty is not readily accessible. Such research can improve 
our understanding of the determinants of investors’ information search and acquisition (see for 
example, Thayer, 2011). 
To conclude, my dissertation examines conditions under which investors’ uncertainty 
judgments are influenced by their perceptions about the likelihood of analyst herding. The 
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findings suggest that while investors are aware of analysts’ tendency to herd their forecasts, 
investors do not always adjust their uncertainty judgments to account for potential analyst 
herding. The findings also have implications for research on investors’ reactions to the 
characteristics of analyst forecasts and research on the determinants of investors’ uncertainty 
judgments.    
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APPENDIX 1 
STUDY 1 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
 
[Pages marking the beginning and end of each envelope are not part of  
the materials, they are added only to facilitate the review process] 
[This page is not part of the experimental materials] 
 
 
 
Beginning of Envelope 1 
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General Instructions 
Your participation in this study is important, and we thank you for taking time from your busy 
schedule to assist us.  You should be able to complete this case in 20-30 minutes. This case 
includes information about ABC Corporation. Your task will be to review that information, 
provide judgments about the company, and answer questions about your experience and 
background.   
The information included in the case is not intended to be completely representative of what 
would normally be available when you evaluate a firm.  Providing you with that level of detail 
would require more time to complete the case than could realistically be requested.  Please 
make the best judgments you can based on the information provided in these materials. 
If you have any questions during the study, do not hesitate to ask the researcher who 
administers this session. We ask that you do not discuss this project with your peers for 
approximately two weeks because they may complete the study at a different time than you.   
 
 
 
 
Please look at the clock and record the time you start on the study. 
Starting Time: __________ 
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Part One 
Background Information 
ABC Corporation is a mid-sized company that manufactures and markets basic chemicals, vinyls, 
polymers, and fabricated products. The company was founded in 1980 and is headquartered in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
Products 
ABC operates in two segments, Olefins and Vinyls. The Olefins segment offers ethylene, 
polyethylene, styrene monomer, and various ethylene co-products, such as propylene, crude 
butadiene, and hydrogen. The Vinyls segment provides polyvinyl chloride (PVC), vinyl chloride 
monomer, chlorine, and caustic soda. This segment also manufactures and sells products 
fabricated from PVC, including pipes, window and door profiles, and fences. The company’s 
products are used in consumer and industrial markets, such as flexible and rigid packaging, 
automotive products, coatings, and residential and commercial construction, as well as other 
durable and non-durable goods.  
Product Markets 
ABC offers its products for chemical processors, plastics fabricators, small construction 
contractors, municipalities, and supply warehouses primarily in the United States, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
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[For participants in the low dispersion/low volatility condition only – historical earnings on left] 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
Your task is to forecast ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. The first chart below (on left) illustrates ABC’s historical 
EPS for the years 20X1 – 20X6. The second chart below (on right) illustrates five analyst forecasts of ABC’s EPS for the year ending 
December 31, 20X7. These forecasts were made during February 20X7.  
Assume that the period 20X1 – 20X7 is characterized by stable macroeconomic conditions. Also, assume that none of the analyst 
information reported here comes from analysts who work for investment banks or brokerage houses that have investment banking 
relations with ABC.   
 
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
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[For participants in the low dispersion/low volatility condition only – analyst forecasts on left] 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
Your task is to forecast ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. The first chart below (on left) illustrates five analyst 
forecasts of ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. These forecasts were made during February 20X7. The second chart 
below (on right) illustrates ABC’s historical EPS for the years 20X1 – 20X6.  
Assume that the period 20X1 – 20X7 is characterized by stable macroeconomic conditions. Also, assume that none of the analyst 
information reported here comes from analysts who work for investment banks or brokerage houses that have investment banking 
relations with ABC.   
 
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
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[For participants in the low dispersion/high volatility condition only – historical earnings on left] 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
Your task is to forecast ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. The first chart below (on left) illustrates ABC’s historical 
EPS for the years 20X1 – 20X6. The second chart below (on right) illustrates five analyst forecasts of ABC’s EPS for the year ending 
December 31, 20X7. These forecasts were made during February 20X7.  
Assume that the period 20X1 – 20X7 is characterized by stable macroeconomic conditions. Also, assume that none of the analyst 
information reported here comes from analysts who work for investment banks or brokerage houses that have investment banking 
relations with ABC.   
 
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
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[For participants in the low dispersion/high volatility condition only – analyst forecasts on left] 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
Your task is to forecast ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. The first chart below (on left) illustrates five analyst 
forecasts of ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. These forecasts were made during February 20X7. The second chart 
below (on right) illustrates ABC’s historical EPS for the years 20X1 – 20X6.  
Assume that the period 20X1 – 20X7 is characterized by stable macroeconomic conditions. Also, assume that none of the analyst 
information reported here comes from analysts who work for investment banks or brokerage houses that have investment banking 
relations with ABC. 
 
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
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[For participants in the high dispersion/low volatility condition only – historical earnings on left] 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
Your task is to forecast ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. The first chart below (on left) illustrates ABC’s historical 
EPS for the years 20X1 – 20X6. The second chart below (on right) illustrates five analyst forecasts of ABC’s EPS for the year ending 
December 31, 20X7. These forecasts were made during February 20X7.  
Assume that the period 20X1 – 20X7 is characterized by stable macroeconomic conditions. Also, assume that none of the analyst 
information reported here comes from analysts who work for investment banks or brokerage houses that have investment banking 
relations with ABC.   
 
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
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[For participants in the high dispersion/low volatility condition only – analyst forecasts on left] 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
Your task is to forecast ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. The first chart below (on left) illustrates five analyst 
forecasts of ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. These forecasts were made during February 20X7. The second chart 
below (on right) illustrates ABC’s historical EPS for the years 20X1 – 20X6.  
Assume that the period 20X1 – 20X7 is characterized by stable macroeconomic conditions. Also, assume that none of the analyst 
information reported here comes from analysts who work for investment banks or brokerage houses that have investment banking 
relations with ABC. 
 
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
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[For participants in the high dispersion/high volatility condition only – historical earnings on left] 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
Your task is to forecast ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. The first chart below (on left) illustrates ABC’s historical 
EPS for the years 20X1 – 20X6. The second chart below (on right) illustrates five analyst forecasts of ABC’s EPS for the year ending 
December 31, 20X7. These forecasts were made during February 20X7.  
Assume that the period 20X1 – 20X7 is characterized by stable macroeconomic conditions. Also, assume that none of the analyst 
information reported here comes from analysts who work for investment banks or brokerage houses that have investment banking 
relations with ABC.   
 
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
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[For participants in the high dispersion/high volatility condition only – analyst forecasts on left] 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
Your task is to forecast ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. The first chart below (on left) illustrates five analyst 
forecasts of ABC’s EPS for the year ending December 31, 20X7. These forecasts were made during February 20X7. The second chart 
below (on right) illustrates ABC’s historical EPS for the years 20X1 – 20X6.  
Assume that the period 20X1 – 20X7 is characterized by stable macroeconomic conditions. Also, assume that none of the analyst 
information reported here comes from analysts who work for investment banks or brokerage houses that have investment banking 
relations with ABC. 
 
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
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Based on the information given so far, please provide your own forecast of ABC’s EPS for 
20X7 and indicate how confident you are in your forecast.  
 
1. My forecast of ABC’s EPS for 20X7 is: $__________. 
 
 
2. How confident are you in your own forecast? 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All 
Confident      
Very 
Confident 
 
 
Please answer the following questions about your forecast of ABC’s Earnings. 
 
3. I am 95% sure ABC’s EPS for 20X7 will be no higher than __________. 
 
4. I am 95% sure ABC’s EPS for 20X7 will be no lower than __________. 
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Please respond to the following statements about ABC Corporation.  
 
1. I believe ABC is an attractive investment. 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree      
Strongly 
Agree 
 
2. I am willing to invest in ABC’s stock. 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree      
Strongly 
Agree 
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Please return this form to Envelope 1.  
You can then proceed to Envelope 2.   
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End of Envelope 1 
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Beginning of Envelope 2 
  
105 
 
Part Two 
Please answer the following question about ABC Corporation. 
1. Please assess the risk of an investment in ABC’s common stock relative to that of an average 
firm of equivalent size that produces and sells similar chemical products.  
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Much 
Lower   
Average 
   
Much  
Higher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
106 
 
Please answer the following questions about analyst forecasts of ABC’s earnings.  
1. How helpful were analyst forecasts for developing your own forecast of ABC’s earnings for 
20X7? 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All 
Helpful      
Very 
Helpful 
 
2. I believe that analyst forecasts of ABC’s earnings are accurate. 
 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree      
Strongly 
Agree 
 
3. I believe that, on average, analyst forecasts of ABC’s EPS for 20X7 will turn out to be 
________ ABC’s actual EPS for that year.  
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lower than   Equal to   Higher than 
 
 
Please answer the following questions regarding your beliefs about the analysts who follow 
ABC. 
1. I believe that the analysts who follow ABC are trustworthy.   
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree      
Strongly 
Agree 
 
2. I believe that the analysts who follow ABC are competent in making earnings forecasts. 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree      
Strongly 
Agree 
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Please respond to the following questions about ABC Corporation and analyst forecasts for 
that company.  
1. Based on ABC’s annual EPS for 20X1 – 20X6, I believe that ABC experiences ________ 
earnings volatility. 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low      
Very 
High 
 
2. You saw forecasts of ABC’s EPS for 20X7 made by five different analysts. To what extent do 
these analysts agree on ABC’s forecasted EPS? 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Low 
Agreement      
Very High 
Agreement 
 
3. How surprised were you by the level of agreement among analysts on ABC’s forecasted EPS 
for 20X7? 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All 
Surprised      
Very 
Surprised 
 
4. I believe that analysts find it ________ to forecast ABC’s EPS. 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Easy      
Very 
Difficult 
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Please answer the following questions about your own forecast of ABC’s earnings.  
1. It was ________ for me to forecast ABC’s EPS for 20X7. 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Easy      
Very 
Difficult 
 
 
Please answer the following question about yourself.  
1. When I make an investment, protecting the principal of my investment is more important 
for me than achieving significant growth.   
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree      
Strongly 
Agree 
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Please return this form to Envelope 2.  
You can then proceed to Envelope 3.   
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End of Envelope 2 
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Beginning of Envelope 3 
  
112 
 
[For participants in the low dispersion/low volatility condition only – historical earnings on left] 
Part Three 
In Part One of this case, you viewed the following two charts illustrating ABC’s historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 and analyst forecasts of 
ABC’s EPS for 20X7. You were asked to forecast ABC’s EPS for 20X7, assess your confidence in your forecast, and make other 
judgments about ABC.  
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this part of the case, assume that analyst forecasts for ABC’s EPS for 20X7 are instead represented by the chart below. All other 
information about ABC (including historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6) is identical to what you read in Part One.   
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.96 0.94 1.02 0.92 1.01 0.97 
20X1 20X2 20X3 20X4 20X5 20X6
An
nu
al
 E
PS
 ($
) 
0.99 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.98 
Analyst
A
Analyst
B
Analyst
C
Analyst
D
Analyst
E
An
nu
al
 E
PS
 ($
) 
1.27 
0.67 
0.97 
0.82 
1.12 
Analyst
A
Analyst
B
Analyst
C
Analyst
D
Analyst
E
An
nu
al
 E
PS
 ($
) 
0.96 0.94 1.02 0.92 1.01 0.97 
20X1 20X2 20X3 20X4 20X5 20X6
An
nu
al
 E
PS
 ($
) 
113 
 
[For participants in the low dispersion/low volatility condition only – analyst forecasts on left] 
Part Three 
In Part One of this case, you viewed the following two charts illustrating analyst forecasts of ABC’s EPS for 20X7 and ABC’s historical 
EPS for 20X1 – 20X6. You were asked to forecast ABC’s EPS for 20X7, assess your confidence in your forecast, and make other 
judgments about ABC.  
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this part of the case, assume that analyst forecasts for ABC’s EPS for 20X7 are instead represented by the chart below. All other 
information about ABC (including historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6) is identical to what you read in Part One.   
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
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 [For participants in the low dispersion/high volatility condition only – historical earnings on left] 
Part Three 
In Part One of this case, you viewed the following two charts illustrating ABC’s historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 and analyst forecasts of 
ABC’s EPS for 20X7. You were asked to forecast ABC’s EPS for 20X7, assess your confidence in your forecast, and make other 
judgments about ABC.  
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this part of the case, assume that analyst forecasts for ABC’s EPS for 20X7 are instead represented by the chart below. All other 
information about ABC (including historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6) is identical to what you read in Part One.  
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
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 [For participants in the low dispersion/high volatility condition only – analyst forecasts on left] 
Part Three 
In Part One of this case, you viewed the following two charts illustrating analyst forecasts of ABC’s EPS for 20X7 and ABC’s historical 
EPS for 20X1 – 20X6. You were asked to forecast ABC’s EPS for 20X7, assess your confidence in your forecast, and make other 
judgments about ABC.  
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this part of the case, assume that analyst forecasts for ABC’s EPS for 20X7 are instead represented by the chart below. All other 
information about ABC (including historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6) is identical to what you read in Part One.  
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
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[For participants in the high dispersion/low volatility condition only – historical earnings on left] 
Part Three 
In Part One of this case, you viewed the following two charts illustrating ABC’s historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 and analyst forecasts of 
ABC’s EPS for 20X7. You were asked to forecast ABC’s EPS for 20X7, assess your confidence in your forecast, and make other 
judgments about ABC.  
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this part of the case, assume that analyst forecasts for ABC’s EPS for 20X7 are instead represented by the chart below. All other 
information about ABC (including historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6) is identical to what you read in Part One.  
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
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[For participants in the high dispersion/low volatility condition only – analyst forecasts on left] 
Part Three 
In Part One of this case, you viewed the following two charts illustrating analyst forecasts of ABC’s EPS for 20X7 and ABC’s historical 
EPS for 20X1 – 20X6. You were asked to forecast ABC’s EPS for 20X7, assess your confidence in your forecast, and make other 
judgments about ABC.  
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this part of the case, assume that analyst forecasts for ABC’s EPS for 20X7 are instead represented by the chart below. All other 
information about ABC (including historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6) is identical to what you read in Part One.  
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
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[For participants in the high dispersion/high volatility condition only – historical earnings on left] 
Part Three 
In Part One of this case, you viewed the following two charts illustrating ABC’s historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 and analyst forecasts of 
ABC’s EPS for 20X7. You were asked to forecast ABC’s EPS for 20X7, assess your confidence in your forecast, and make other 
judgments about ABC.  
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this part of the case, assume that analyst forecasts for ABC’s EPS for 20X7 are instead represented by the chart below. All other 
information about ABC (including historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6) is identical to what you read in Part One.  
Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 
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 [For participants in the high dispersion/high volatility condition only – analyst forecasts on left] 
Part Three 
In Part One of this case, you viewed the following two charts illustrating analyst forecasts of ABC’s EPS for 20X7 and ABC’s historical 
EPS for 20X1 – 20X6. You were asked to forecast ABC’s EPS for 20X7, assess your confidence in your forecast, and make other 
judgments about ABC.  
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this part of the case, assume that analyst forecasts for ABC’s EPS for 20X7 are instead represented by the chart below. All other 
information about ABC (including historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6) is identical to what you read in Part One.  
Analyst Forecasts of EPS for 20X7 Historical EPS for 20X1 – 20X6 
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Please provide your new forecast of ABC’s EPS for 20X7 and indicate how confident you are in 
your new forecast based on the new information that you have just been given.     
 
1. My forecast of ABC’s EPS for 20X7 is: $__________. 
 
 
2. How confident are you in your own forecast? 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All 
Confident      
Very 
Confident 
 
 
Please answer the following questions about your new forecast of ABC’s Earnings. 
 
3. I am 95% sure ABC’s EPS for 20X7 will be no higher than __________. 
 
4. I am 95% sure ABC’s EPS for 20X7 will be no lower than __________. 
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Please explain the reasons that made you change your forecast of ABC’s EPS for 20X7 and/or 
your confidence in your forecast compared to Part One of the study.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Please respond to the following statements about ABC Corporation based on the new 
information that you have just been given.   
 
1. I believe ABC is an attractive investment. 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree      
Strongly 
Agree 
 
2. I am willing to invest in ABC’s stock. 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree      
Strongly 
Agree 
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Please answer the following questions about yourself. 
1. Have you ever made investments in the common stock of a company?      Yes      No 
 If yes, approximately how many times? ________ times 
2. Have you ever made investments in a common stock mutual fund?      Yes      No 
       If yes, approximately how many times? ________ times 
3. Do you plan to invest in the common stock of a company or a common stock mutual fund at 
some time in the future?      Yes      No 
4. Have you ever forecasted a company’s earnings?      Yes      No 
If yes, approximately how many times? ________ times 
5. Have you ever evaluated a company’s performance by analyzing its financial statements?      
Yes      No 
If yes, approximately how many times?  ________ times 
6. Have you ever used analyst earnings forecasts when predicting a company’s earnings 
and/or evaluating the company’s Performance?      Yes      No 
If yes, approximately how many times? ________ times 
7. What program are you enrolled in at UIUC? (Please select one answer) 
____ MAS ____ MBA 
____ MSA ____ MSF 
____ Other (Please specify): ________  
8. What year are you in within that program (for example, 1st, 2nd)? ________. 
9. How many Accounting courses, undergraduate and graduate, have you completed? 
________ (Please indicate the number of course units and not credit hours) 
10. How many Finance courses, undergraduate and graduate, have you completed? ________ 
(Please indicate the number of course units and not credit hours) 
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11. Have you completed, or are you currently registered for, ACCY 517 “Financial Statement 
Analysis”? (Please select one answer) 
____ I have completed ACCY 517. ____ I am currently registered for ACCY 
517. 
____ None of the above.  
12. Have you completed, or are you currently registered for, FIN 521 “Advanced Corporate 
Finance”? (Please Select one answer) 
____ I have completed FIN 521. ____ I am currently registered for FIN 521. 
____ None of the above.  
13. Do you have any prior business work experience?       Yes      No 
If yes, approximately how many years? ________ years, ________ months 
14. Do you have any prior work experience in financial analysis?      Yes      No 
If yes, approximately how many years? ________ years, ________ months 
15. Please indicate your gender:      Male      Female 
16. Please indicate your age: ________ years  
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Please look at the clock and record the time you end the study. 
Ending Time: __________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please return this form back to Envelope 3. 
 
Once more, thank you for participating in this study. 
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[This page is not part of the experimental materials] 
 
 
 
End of Envelope 3 
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APPENDIX 2 
STUDY 2 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
 
Investor Judgment and Decision-Making Study 
General Instructions 
Your participation in this study is important and I thank you for taking time from your busy schedule to 
assist me. You should be able to complete this case in 20-30 minutes. This case includes information that 
is based on a real public company, referred to as American Medical (AmMed) Corporation. Your task will 
be to review that information, provide judgments about the company, and answer questions about your 
experience and background.  Please do not discuss this study with your peers for approximately two 
weeks because they may complete the study at a different time than you. 
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Your Payoff  
You will earn between $5 and $25 for participating in this study. Your payoff will be determined based 
on the number of points you receive which will be converted to dollars at a predetermined rate and will 
be paid to you after the study ends. Your total points include the following three components.   
 
Total 
Points 
 
= 
 Participation  
Points 
 
+ 
 Accuracy  
Points 
 
+  
Earnings 
Performance 
Points 
 
Here is how each component of your total points will be calculated:  
 
Participation Points 
You will receive 25 points for completing the study. 
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Accuracy Points 
You can receive up to 25 additional points for accurately forecasting the annual earnings per share (EPS) 
of AmMed. If your forecast is equal to actual EPS, you will receive 25 points. If your forecast differs from 
(i.e., is higher or lower than) actual EPS by less than 25 cents, you will receive 25 points less 1 point for 
each cent by which your forecast differs from actual EPS. Finally, if your forecast differs from actual EPS 
by 25 cents or more, you will not receive any accuracy points.  
 
Whether your forecast is higher or lower than actual EPS, you will receive more points by forecasting as 
close as possible to actual EPS.   
 
 
 
 
To ensure that you understand how your accuracy points will be calculated, please select the correct 
answer for each of the following questions.  
As the difference between my forecast and actual EPS increases, I will receive 
____ more accuracy points.  
____ less accuracy points. 
 
If my forecast is higher or lower than actual EPS by 10 cents, I will receive  
____ 15 accuracy points 
____ 10 accuracy points 
____ no accuracy points 
 
If your forecast is higher or lower than actual EPS by You will receive 
$0.00 25 points 
$0.01 24 points 
$0.02 23 points 
$0.03 22 points 
… … 
$0.22 3 points 
$0.23 2 points 
$0.24 1 point 
$0.25 or more 0 points 
129 
 
[For participants in the preference-inconsistent conditions only] 
Earnings Performance Points 
This component of your points will depend on AmMed’s performance, measured in terms of actual EPS.  
You can receive or lose up to 25 points depending on how the company’s actual EPS compares to an 
arbitrary benchmark of $2.27 per share.  
An additional 2 points will be added to your total for each cent by which AmMed’s actual EPS is lower 
than $2.27, up to 25 points.  
Your total points will be reduced by 2 points for each cent by which AmMed’s actual EPS is higher than 
$2.27, up to 25 points.  
 
To sum up, you will receive more points as AmMed makes lower earnings, which is similar to holding a 
short position in the company’s stock.  
 
AmMed’s Actual EPS Points you receive Points you lose 
$2.14 or less 25  
$2.15 24  
$2.16 22  
… …  
$2.25 4  
$2.26 2  
$2.27 0 0 
$2.28  2 
$2.29  4 
…  … 
$2.38  22 
$2.39  24 
$2.40 or more  25 
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[For participants in the preference-inconsistent conditions only] 
To ensure that you understand how your earnings performance points will be calculated, please select 
the correct answer for each of the following questions. 
 If the company’s actual EPS is higher than $2.27, I will   
____ receive points  
____ lose points. 
____ neither receive nor lose points.  
 
If the company’s actual EPS is lower than $2.27, I will   
____ receive points  
____ lose points. 
____ neither receive nor lose points.  
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[For participants in the preference-consistent conditions only] 
Earnings Performance Points 
This component of your points will depend on AmMed’s performance, measured in terms of actual EPS.  
You can receive or lose up to 25 points depending on how the company’s actual EPS compares to an 
arbitrary benchmark of $2.27 per share.  
An additional 2 points will be added to your total for each cent by which AmMed’s actual EPS is higher 
than $2.27, up to 25 points.  
Your total points will be reduced by 2 points for each cent by which AmMed’s actual EPS is lower than 
$2.27, up to 25 points.  
 
To sum up, you will receive more points as AmMed makes higher earnings, which is similar to holding a 
long position in the company’s stock.  
 
AmMed’s Actual EPS Points you receive Points you lose 
$2.40 or more 25  
$2.39 24  
$2.38 22  
… …  
$2.29 4  
$2.28 2  
$2.27 0 0 
$2.26  2 
$2.25  4 
…  … 
$2.16  22 
$2.15  24 
$2.14 or less  25 
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[For participants in the preference-consistent conditions only] 
To ensure that you understand how your earnings performance points will be calculated, please select 
the correct answer for each of the following questions. 
 If the company’s actual EPS is higher than $2.27, I will   
____ receive points  
____ lose points. 
____ neither receive nor lose points.  
 
If the company’s actual EPS is lower than $2.27, I will   
____ receive points  
____ lose points. 
____ neither receive nor lose points.  
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Background Information about AmMed Corporation 
AmMed Corporation, a medical technology company, develops, manufactures, and sells medical 
devices, instrument systems, and reagents worldwide. The company’s medical segment produces 
devices that are used in various healthcare settings, such as needles, syringes, and intravenous catheters 
for medication delivery. The company’s diagnostics segment provides products for the detection of 
various diseases and cancers, including integrated systems for specimen collection and microorganism 
identification and drug susceptibility systems. The company’s biosciences segment produces research 
and clinical tools that facilitate the study of cells and their components, such as kits for performing cell 
analysis and cell imaging systems. The company markets its products through independent distribution 
channels and independent sales representatives to healthcare institutions, life science researchers, 
clinical laboratories, the pharmaceutical industry, and the general public. It was founded in 1968 and is 
headquartered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
 
The next chart illustrates AmMed’s historical quarterly and annual EPS for the past four years. Your task 
is to forecast the company’s annual EPS for the current year ending on December 31st, 20X5.  
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[Analyst A makes lowest forecast] 
Analyst Forecasts of AmMed’s EPS 
Assume that three analysts currently follow AmMed’s stock. The following table summarizes analyst 
forecasts of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5 that were outstanding on March 31st, 20X5.  
 
Analyst EPS Forecast 
A $2.24 
B $2.27 
C $2.30 
Consensus (Mean) 
Forecast 
$2.27 
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[Analyst C makes lowest forecast] 
Analyst Forecasts of AmMed’s EPS 
Assume that three analysts currently follow AmMed’s stock. The following table summarizes analyst 
forecasts of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5 that were outstanding on March 31st, 20X5.  
 
Analyst EPS Forecast 
A $2.30 
B $2.27 
C $2.24 
Consensus (Mean) 
Forecast 
$2.27 
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Based on the information given so far, please estimate your level of uncertainty about AmMed’s EPS 
for 20X5.  
 
5. How do you rate your level of uncertainty about AmMed’s EPS for 20X5? 
 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Low 
Uncertainty      
Very High 
Uncertainty 
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Please provide your own forecast of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5 and indicate how confident you are in 
your own forecast.  
 
1. What is your forecast of AmMed’s annual EPS for 20X5?  
 
My forecast is $__________. 
 
 
2. How confident are you that AmMed’s actual EPS for 20X5 will be equal to your own forecast?  
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All 
Confident      
Very 
Confident 
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The following article was published in the Wall Street Journal on April 15th, 20X5.  
 
AmMed Expects Tough Times in Domestic Markets, Better Abroad 
By Mark Shelby  
April 15th, 20X5.  
AmMed, a leading medical technology company, said yesterday it expects increased competition in the 
domestic market for medical diagnostics as more competitors entered that market during the first 
quarter of 20X5. The company is considering lowering its prices in order to preserve its market share.  
Randy Eden, AmMed’s CEO, explains that the company is in a better position in the emerging Asian 
markets where rising standards of living create more demand for high quality healthcare. The company 
expects its medical diagnostics sales to grow in these foreign markets during the year.  
AmMed, headquartered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, manufactures and sells a broad range of medical 
supplies, devices, laboratory equipment and diagnostic products. It serves healthcare institutions, life 
science researchers, clinical laboratories, industry and the general public.  
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[For participants in the successive forecasts conditions only – Analyst A makes lowest forecast] 
On April 16th, 20X5, Analyst A revised his/her forecast of AmMed’s annual EPS for 20X5 up by 10 cents, 
from $2.24 to $2.34.  
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[For participants in the successive forecasts conditions only – Analyst A makes lowest forecast] 
On April 17th, 20X5, each of Analysts B and C revised his/her forecast of AmMed’s annual EPS for 20X5 
up by 10 cents, from $2.27 and $2.30 to $2.37 and $2.40 respectively.  
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[For participants in the successive forecasts conditions only – Analyst A makes lowest forecast] 
The following table summarizes analyst forecasts of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5 that were outstanding on 
April 17th, 20X5.  
 
Analyst EPS Forecast Date Issued 
A $2.34 April 16th  
B $2.37 April 17th  
C $2.40 April 17th  
Consensus (Mean) 
Forecast 
$2.37 
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[For participants in the successive forecasts conditions only – Analyst C makes lowest forecast] 
On April 16th, 20X5, Analyst C revised his/her forecast of AmMed’s annual EPS for 20X5 up by 10 cents, 
from $2.24 to $2.34.  
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[For participants in the successive forecasts conditions only – Analyst C makes lowest forecast] 
On April 17th, 20X5, each of Analysts A and B revised his/her forecast of AmMed’s annual EPS for 20X5 
up by 10 cents, from $2.30 and $2.27 to $2.40 and $2.37 respectively.  
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[For participants in the successive forecasts conditions only – Analyst C makes lowest forecast] 
The following table summarizes analyst forecasts of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5 that were outstanding on 
April 17th, 20X5.   
 
Analyst EPS Forecast Date Issued 
A $2.40 April 17th  
B $2.37 April 17th  
C $2.34 April 16th  
Consensus (Mean) 
Forecast 
$2.37 
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[For participants in the concurrent forecasts conditions only – Analyst A makes the lowest forecast] 
On April 17th, 20X5, each of Analysts A, B, and C revised his/her forecast of AmMed’s annual EPS for 
20X5 up by 10 cents, from $2.24, $2.27, and $2.30 to $2.34, $2.37, and $2.40 respectively.  
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[For participants in the concurrent forecasts conditions only – Analyst A makes the lowest forecast] 
The following table summarizes analyst forecasts of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5 that were outstanding on 
April 17th, 20X5.  
 
Analyst EPS Forecast Date Issued 
A $2.34 April 17th 
B $2.37 April 17th 
C $2.40 April 17th 
Consensus (Mean) 
Forecast 
$2.37  
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[For participants in the concurrent forecasts conditions only – Analyst C makes the lowest forecast] 
On April 17th, 20X5, each of Analysts A, B, and C revised his/her forecast of AmMed’s annual EPS for 
20X5 up by 10 cents, from $2.30, $2.27, and $2.24 to $2.40, $2.37, and $2.34 respectively.  
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[For participants in the concurrent forecasts conditions only – Analyst C makes the lowest forecast] 
The following table summarizes analyst forecasts of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5 that were outstanding on 
April 17th, 20X5.  
 
Analyst EPS Forecast Date Issued 
A $2.40 April 17th 
B $2.37 April 17th 
C $2.34 April 17th 
Consensus (Mean) 
Forecast 
$2.37  
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Based on the new information given, please provide your new estimate of your level of uncertainty 
about AmMed’s EPS for 20X5.  
 
1. How do you rate your level of uncertainty about AmMed’s EPS for 20X5? 
 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Low 
Uncertainty      
Very High 
Uncertainty 
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Based on the new information given, please provide your new forecast of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5 and 
indicate how confident you are in your new forecast.  
 
1. What is your forecast of AmMed’s annual EPS for 20X5?  
 
My forecast is $__________. 
 
 
2. How confident are you that AmMed’s actual EPS for 20X5 will be equal to your own forecast?  
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All 
Confident      
Very 
Confident 
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Please answer the following questions regarding your beliefs about the revised analyst forecasts of 
AmMed’s EPS for 20X5.  
 
1. How likely is it that one or more analysts were influenced by (i.e., copied) the revised forecasts 
issued by the rest of the analysts?   
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All 
Likely      
Very  
Likely 
 
2. How likely is it that each analyst received similar information about the company’s future earnings, 
independent of the other two analysts and their revised forecasts?   
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All 
Likely      
Very  
Likely 
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Please answer the following questions regarding your beliefs about the three analysts who follow 
AmMed.  
 
1. How competent is each analyst in making earnings forecasts?  
Analyst  
A 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
Competent      
Very 
Competent 
 
Analyst  
B 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
Competent 
     Very 
Competent 
 
Analyst  
C 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
Competent      
Very 
Competent 
 
 
2. How good is each analyst’s access to information related to AmMed’s future earnings?  
Analyst  
A 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
Good      
Very  
Good 
 
Analyst  
B 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
Good      
Very  
Good 
 
Analyst  
C 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
Good      
Very  
Good 
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3. How trustworthy is each analyst?  
 
Analyst  
A 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
Trustworthy      
Very 
Trustworthy 
 
Analyst  
B 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
Trustworthy 
     Very 
Trustworthy 
 
Analyst  
C 
       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
Trustworthy      
Very 
Trustworthy 
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Please answer the following questions regarding your beliefs about the revised analyst forecasts of 
AmMed’s EPS for 20X5.  
 
1. The three analysts revised their forecasts of AmMed’s EPS  for 20X5 ________.  
 on the same day   on different days 
 
2. The three analysts revised their forecasts by ________.   
 the same amount   different amounts 
 
3. After analysts revised their forecasts of AmMed’s EPS for 20X5, the new consensus analyst forecast 
was equal to $________.  
 $2.27  $2.37 
 
 
4. The arbitrary benchmark used to determine the earnings performance points I will receive/lose in 
this study is equal to ________.  
 $2.27  $2.37 
 
5. If AmMed’s actual EPS for 20X5 turn out to be equal to the new consensus analyst forecast, earnings 
performance points will be ________ the total points I receive in this study. 
 added to   deducted from 
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Please answer the following questions about yourself. 
1. Have you ever made investments in the common stock of a company?      Yes      No 
 If yes, approximately how many times? ________ times 
2. Have you ever made investments in a common stock mutual fund?      Yes      No 
       If yes, approximately how many times? ________ times 
3. Do you plan to invest in the common stock of a company or a common stock mutual fund at some 
time in the future?      Yes      No 
4. What program are you enrolled in at CSUF? (Please select one answer) 
____ Full-time MBA ____ Evening/Flexible MBA  
____ MBA for Working Professionals ____ MS in Accountancy 
____ Other (Please specify): _________________  
5. What year are you in within that program (for example, 1st, 2nd)? ________. 
6. What is your concentration within that program? ________________.  
7. How many Accounting courses, undergraduate and graduate, have you completed? ________ 
(Please indicate the number of courses and not units) 
8. How many Finance courses, undergraduate and graduate, have you completed? ________ (Please 
indicate the number of courses and not units) 
9. Have you completed, or are you currently registered for, ACCT 460 “Seminar in Financial Statement 
Analysis” or a similar course? (Please select one answer) 
____ I have completed ACCT 460 or a similar course. 
____ I am currently registered for ACCT 460.  
____ None of the above. 
 
10. Do you have any prior business work experience?       Yes      No 
If yes, approximately how many years? ________ years, ________ months 
11. Do you have any prior work experience in financial analysis?      Yes      No 
If yes, approximately how many years? ________ years, ________ months 
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12. Please indicate your gender:      Male      Female 
13. Please indicate your age: ________ years 
 
 
 
